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Assisted Suicide, Morality, and Law:
Why Prohibiting Assisted Suicide
Violates the Establishment Clause
Edward Rubin 63 Vand. L. Rev. 763 (2010)
This Article argues that general prohibitions against assisted
suicide violate the Establishment Clause because they support a
particular and religiously based moral position. Many laws overlap
with religious proscriptions, of course. The conclusion that laws
against assisted suicide are unconstitutional because of their
religious origin is based on the specific historical context of these
laws within our existing culture. Over the course of Western
civilization, attitudes about suicide have oscillated from positive
approbation in many Greek and Roman sources, to outright and
unalterable opposition by Christian writers, to acceptance and
limited approval by contemporary secular thinkers and health
practitioners. At present, traditional, Christian-based morality and
an emerging secular morality centered on the value of self-
fulfillment are in conflict within our society, a conflict that probably
reflects a slow historical transition from the first to the second. The
intense debate about the morality of assisted suicide is one aspect of
this conflict. Blanket prohibitions of assisted suicide support one
side of this debate, a side that happens to be allied with the
Christian religion. Consequently, these laws violate the
Establishment Clause.
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For the past several decades, American policymakers and
judges have been grappling with the closely related issues of assisted
suicide and euthanasia. These issues gain drama from the
permanence of death and terror that accompanies it. They gain
poignancy from the fact that unlike capital punishment-another
purposeful termination of life-the laws governing assisted suicide
and euthanasia potentially affect us all as we head toward the
decrepitude that frequently accompanies our final years. Emotion
runs high on these subjects, making them unusually difficult to
resolve, and the complex imbrications of ethical, metaphysical, and
jurisprudential theories that address them seem to add complexity
without providing clarity. The injection of these subjects into the
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congressional debate over the seemingly separate topic of health care
reform is only the latest indication of the controversy and confusion
that accompanies them.'
This Article is directed to the question of assisted suicide, and
specifically to the constitutionality of laws prohibiting that practice.
The Supreme Court has addressed the issue several times over the
past few decades. In Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of
Health,2 the Court held that the Due Process Clause provides people
with a constitutional right to refuse life-saving medical treatment. But
soon thereafter, in Washington v. Glucksberg and Vacco v. Quill, the
Court held that neither the Due Process Clause nor the Equal
Protection Clause prohibits states from making it a crime to assist a
person in committing suicide.3 Most recently, in Gonzales v. Oregon,
the Court invalidated a Bush Administration effort to preempt the
state of Oregon's Death with Dignity Act, which authorizes physicians
to provide lethal drugs to an adult suffering from an incurable
disease.4 The Gonzales decision, quite properly, does not address the
constitutional issues, since the question that was raised involved the
statutory authority of the Attorney General to preempt state law.5 But
1. See, e.g., Carrie Budoff Brown, Will Proposal Promote Euthanasia?, POLITICO, July 28,
2009, http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0709/25486.html; Stephanie Condon; Ten Health Care
Reform Myths, CBS NEWS, Aug. 6, 2009, http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2009/08/05/
politics/main5215880.shtml; Barack Obama's Abortion Drama: Religion is Causing the President
Headaches, ECONOMIST, Mar. 13-19, 2010, at 38.
2. 497 U.S. 261, 286-87 (1990); see also RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM'S LAW: THE MORAL
READING OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 130-43 (1996) (providing a summary of the Cruzan
decision and noting that this case recognized the constitutional principle "that a state has no
right to keep a comatose patient alive against his previously expressed wish[es]"); Louis
Seidman, Confusion at the Border: Cruzan, The Right to Die," and the Public/Private
Distinction, 1991 SUP. CT. REV. 47, 49-55 (providing an explanation of the Cruzan decision and
its holding).
3. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 735 (1997); Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793, 807-
09 (1997). The doctrine that the Supreme Court has fashioned in this area is not particularly
unstable; there is certainly a recognizable difference between terminating life support and
affirmatively causing death. But the rationale behind these two actions is sufficiently similar to
raise questions about the conceptual coherence of the Court's approach. At the pragmatic level,
both involve efforts by physicians to provide terminally ill patients with a dignified and painless
death. At the theoretical level, both are based on the idea that people should have the right to
decide whether they want to go on living, and that those who truly choose to die should not be
prevented from obtaining assistance in implementing their decision.
4. OR. REV. STAT. §§ 127.805-885 (2005).
5. Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 348 (2006). In 2001, Attorney General John Ashcroft
issued an interpretive rule, 21 C.F.R. § 1306 (2005), declaring that prescribing drugs to
terminate a person's life violated the Controlled Substances Act of 1970, 21 U.S.C. §§ 801-903
(2006). The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit invalidated the rule, holding that it ran afoul
of constitutional federalism and reflected an improper interpretation of the Act. Oregon v.
Ashcroft, 368 F.3d 1118, 1125-26 (9th Cir. 2004). On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed the
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the majority opinion and the two dissents are clearly written with the
awareness that these issues lie just below the legal surface of the case.
Thus Gonzales, when viewed in conjunction with the controversy
surrounding Terri Schiavo's death,6 the prosecution of Dr. Jack
Kevorkian,7 a second state's legalization of assisted suicide by voter
initiative,8 and the current health care debate, indicates that the
question of assisted suicide is likely to occupy a central place in public
discourse for some time.9
The most commonly stated legal rationale for arguing that the
Constitution protects people's ability to obtain assistance in ending
their lives is the so-called right to die, which is grounded on either
substantive due process or the right of privacy, that is, the penumbra
of the first eight amendments.10 The Court employed this rationale in
Ninth Circuit holding on the ground that the rule lay beyond the authority granted to the
Attorney General under the Controlled Substances Act.
A somewhat similar case, Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005), involved an effort by the
federal government to preempt California's Compassionate Use Act, which legalized marijuana
when used pursuant to the instructions of a licensed physician. Although the case obviously
reverberated with larger issues, the Court restricted itself to federalism doctrine, in this case
validating the federal action.
6. See generally THE CASE OF TERRY SCHIAVO: ETHICS AT THE END OF LIFE (Arthur L.
Caplan, James J. McCartney & Dominic A. Sisti eds., 2006) (collecting documents related to the
controversy); DIANA LYNNE, TERRI'S STORY: THE COURT-ORDERED DEATH OF AN AMERICAN
WOMAN (2005); Joshua E. Perry, Biblical BioPolitics: Judicial Process, Religious Rhetoric, Terri
Schiavo and Beyond, 16 HEALTH MATRIX 553 (2006). For views of those involved in the Terri
Schiavo controversy, see MICHAEL SCHIAVO & MICHAEL HIRSH, TERRI: THE TRUTH (2006); MARY
& ROBERT SCHINDLER ET AL., A LIFE THAT MATTERS: THE LEGACY OF TERRI SCHIAVO - A LESSON
FOR US ALL (2006).
7. See People v. Kevorkian, 639 N.W.2d 291, 332 (Mich. Ct. App. 2001) (upholding trial
court conviction of Dr. Kevorkian). For a biography of Dr. Jack Kevorkian's life including a
summary of his prosecution, see NEAL NICOL & HARRY WYLIE, BETWEEN THE DYING AND THE
DEAD: DR. JACK KEVORKIAN'S LIFE AND THE BATTLE TO LEGALIZE EUTHANASIA (2006).
8. This past Election Day, voters in the State of Washington approved Initiative 1000 by a
margin of 58 percent to 42 percent. Curt Woodward, Wash. Voters Approve Assisted Suicide
Initiative, SEATTLE TIMES, Nov. 4, 2008, at Al. The measure was modeled on Oregon's Death
with Dignity Act. See OR. REV. STAT. §§ 127.805-885 (2005). Interestingly, it was the preexisting
Washington statute forbidding assisted suicide that the Supreme Court found constitutional in
Washington v. Glucksberg. See 521 U.S. 702, 735 (1997).
9. For thoughtful discussions of these arguments, pro and con, see GERALD DWORKIN, R.G.
FREY & SISSELA BOK, EUTHANASIA AND PHYSICIAN-ASSISTED SUICIDE: FOR AND AGAINST (1998);
ARGUING EUTHANASIA: THE CONTROVERSY OVER MERCY KILLING, ASSISTED SUICIDE AND THE
RIGHT TO DIE (Jonathan D. Moreno ed., 1995); JAMES RACHELS, THE END OF LIFE: EUTHANASIA
AND MORALITY (Oxford Univ. Press, 1986); Judith Thompson, Killing, Letting Die, and the
Trolley Problem, 59 MONIST 204 (1976).
10. See Superintendent of Belchertown State Sch. v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417, 424-33
(Mass. 1977) (discussing the constitutionally protected right to die); In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647,
667-69 (N.J. 1976) (same); LAWRENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1365 (2d ed.
1988); Rachel D. Kleinberg & Toshiro M. Mochizuki, The Final Freedom: Maintaining Autonomy
and Valuing Life in Physician-Assisted Suicide Cases, 32 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 197, 209-24
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Cruzan and rejected it in Glucksberg.11 This Article does not rely on
that approach. Substantive due process and the right of privacy, which
may or may not be the same thing, are such troubled and vaguely
defined doctrinesl 2 that they seem to obscure rather than illuminate
the underlying moral issues on wlich decisions regarding human
rights ultimately rest.13 That is not to say that they should be
eliminated from our constitutional jurisprudence, but only that they
are best avoided if an alternative, more textually grounded rationale
is available.
This Article argues that the intense controversy about assisted
suicide and the related issue of terminating life support reflects the
conflict between two moral systems, one traditional and the other
evolving. It further argues that because one of these conflicting
systems-the traditional one-is religiously based, any governmental
action that imposes this morality through coercive governmental
action violates the Establishment Clause. There have been previous
efforts to use the Establishment Clause in place of substantive due
process or the right of privacy, most notably in dealing with the issue
of abortion.14 These arguments, however, suffer from well-recognized
conceptual defects,15 and more seriously, it will be argued, are
nonhistorical. The argument in this Article is based on the specific
(1997) (critiquing existing right to die analyses and offering a modified framework for analyzing
the constitutionality of the right to die under the Due Process Clause); Jonathan Rosen, The
Constitutionality of Statutes Prohibiting and Permitting Physician-Assisted Suicide, 51 U. MIAMI
L. REV. 875, 880-903 (1997) (analyzing the constitutional right to die and the related right of a
physician assisted suicide); Cass Sunstein, The Right to Die, 106 YALE L.J. 1123, 1124-44 (1997);
Note, Physician-Assisted Suicide and the Right to Die With Assistance, 105 HARV. L. REV. 2021,
2021-41 (1992) (analyzing whether the constitution provides constitutional right to die before
any court had recognized the legality of physician assisted suicide).
11. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 735 (1997); Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of
Health, 497 U.S. 261, 286-87 (1990). The companion case, Vacco, rejected the less common
argument that laws against assisted suicide violate the equal protection clause. 521 U.S. 793,
799 (1997). The Court had little difficulty concluding that the Equal Protection Clause creates no
substantive rights and that no suspect classification was involved. Id.
12. See generally LAURENCE H. TRIBE, ABORTION: THE CLASH OF ABSOLUTES (1990); Robert
Dixon, The "New" Substantive Due Process and the Democratic Ethic: A Prolegomenon, 1976
BYU. L. REV. 43; John Hart Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE
L.J. 920 (1973); Ruth Gavison, Privacy and the Limits of Law, 89 YALE L.J. 421 (1980); Jed
Rubenfeld, The Right of Privacy, 102 HARV. L. REV. 737 (1989); Raymond Wacks, The Poverty of
Privacy, 96 L.Q. REV. 73 (1980). For a defense of the privacy doctrine, see ANITA ALLEN, UNEASY
ACCESS: PRIVACY FOR WOMEN IN A FREE SOCIETY (1988).
13. For a discussion on the moral character of human rights, see EDWARD RUBIN, BEYOND
CAMELOT: RETHINKING POLITICS AND LAW FOR THE MODERN STATE 260-95 (2005).
14. See, e.g., DWORKIN, supra note 2, at 98-110 (applying the Establishment Clause in the
context of abortion); Lawrence H. Tribe, Foreword: Toward a Model of Roles in the Due Process of
Life and Law, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1, 21-25 (1973) (same).
15. See infra Part II.A.
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historical experience of Western civilization and the idea that in our
society, current laws against assisted suicide are in fact efforts to take
sides in an ongoing controversy and impose a religiously based
morality on those who would otherwise choose an alternative
approach. As a result, the Article grounds its argument about the
unconstitutionality of laws against assisted suicide on an explicit,
well-developed constitutional provision, rather than on substantive
due process or the penumbral right of privacy.
Part I explores the relationship between systems of morality
and views of suicide, tracing the changes in Western culture from a
morality of honor to a morality of higher purposes to a morality of self-
fulfillment. It further discusses the connection between the morality of
higher purposes and the Christian religion. Part II discusses
Establishment Clause doctrine. It then shows how laws against
suicide or assisted suicide represent the coercive imposition of the
Christian-based morality of higher purposes on citizens, and are thus
unconstitutional under the First Amendment.
I. SUICIDE AND MORALITY
While nothing is more universal or ineluctable than death, few
things are more culture dependent or avoidable than suicide. The
patterns of suicide and attitudes toward suicide exhibit wide gyrations
from one society to another and from one era to another in the same
society. Consequently, the study of suicide provides a window into one
of the most disconcerting but significant aspects of human culture,
namely, the malleability of moral attitudes. As we look back over
three millennia of Western civilization, the variation in these patterns
and attitudes betoken changes in our society's most basic conceptions
of good and bad, right and wrong.
The attitudinal gyrations that characterize Western attitudes
toward suicide can be illustrated by three quotations, three snapshots
from a long, complex tradition. The first is from Plutarch, the second-
century moral philosopher. Among his many works are the Parallel
Lives, biographies of famous Greeks and Romans, arranged in pairs
and designed to teach moral lessons by positive and negative
example. 16 Plutarch pairs Demosthenes, the fiery Athenian orator and
politician, with Cicero, the urbane Stoic orator, politician, and
16. PLUTARCH, THE LIVES OF THE NOBLE GRECIANS AND ROMANS (John Dryden trans.,
Arthur Hugh Clough ed., Modern Library, rev. ed. 1992) (1979).
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philosopher.17 In their later years, both men found themselves under
sentence of death and with no means of escape. Comparing their
responses to this situation, Plutarch writes:
Cicero's death excites our pity; for an old man to be miserably carried up and down by
his servants, flying and hiding himself from that death which was, in the course of
nature, so near at hand; and yet at last to be murdered. Demosthenes, though he
seemed at first a little to supplicate, yet, by his preparing and keeping the poison by
him, demands our admiration; and still more admirable was his using it. When the
temple of the god no longer afforded him a sanctuary, he took refuge, as it were, at a
mightier alter, freeing himself from arms and soldiers, and laughing to scorn the cruelty
ofAntipater. 18
Some twelve centuries later, Dante placed all suicides on the
seventh level of Hell, where they are turned into stunted trees that
produce poison in the place of fruit. One of these monstrosities tells
the poet what has happened to him and what will occur on Judgment
Day:
When the fierce spirit separates amiss
From out the body whence itself has torn,
Minos consigns it to the seventh abyss ...
We shall go seek our bodies like the rest,
But with them never to be re-arrayed
For 'tis not just to have what we divest.
Here we shall drag them, and the forest glade
Shall see our bodies hanging dismally,
Each on the thorn tree of its injured shade. 19
The person who has suffered this fate is Pier delle Vigne,
advisor to Frederick II, the Holy Roman Emperor, who incited
Frederick's ire by allegedly conspiring with Frederick's archenemy,
Pope Innocent IV. At the time he committed the suicide for which
Dante, and his society, were so ready to condemn him to eternal
perdition, delle Vigne's eyes had been put out, and he had been locked
in an underground dungeon. 20
Six centuries after Dante, Emile Durkheim described the
distribution and frequency of suicide and attempted to discern its
17. Id. at 1070-72. The comparison is somewhat weird, since the two men were not only
very different people but played rather different roles in public affairs.
18. Id. at 1072.
19. DANTE ALIGHIERI, THE DIVINE COMEDY 52 (Melville Best Anderson trans., 1921).
20. DANTE ALIGHIERI, THE DINE COMEDY 80 n.3 (Carlyle-Wicksteed trans., Modern
Library 1932).
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cause in a book that remains one of the classics of sociology. 2 1 After
discussing the "extra-social factors" that cause suicide, such as
psychopathology and heredity, he proceeds to consider social causes,
distinguishing among egoistic, altruistic, and anomic suicide.
Summarizing the effect of these social causes, he states:
[I]ndividual peculiarities could not explain the social suicide-rate; for the latter varies in
considerable proportions, whereas the different combinations of circumstances which
constitute the immediate antecedents of individual cases of suicide retain approximately
the same relative frequency. They are therefore not the determining causes of the act
which they precede....
Wholly different are the results we obtained when we forgot the individual and sought
the causes of the suicidal aptitude of each society in the nature of the societies
themselves. The relations of suicide to certain states of social environment are as direct
and constant as its relations to facts of a biological and physical character were seen to
be uncertain and ambiguous. Here at last we are face to face with real laws, allowing us
to attempt a methodological classification of types of suicide. 2 2
What is behind the dramatic changes in Western attitudes
toward suicide that these three quotations typify? Not surprisingly,
the answer is that the changes reflect more general transformations in
the moral systems that prevailed in the different eras from which the
quotations are drawn. This Part will trace, in an admittedly cursory
fashion, the nature of those changes in morality. The passage from
Plutarch reflects the characteristic morality of the Greco-Roman
world, which can be described as a morality of honor. The passage
from Dante reflects the characteristic morality of the medieval and
early modern period, which is described here as a morality of higher
purposes. Durkheim's discussion reflects the emerging morality of
contemporary times, which is described as a morality of self-
fulfillment. Implicit in this account is that morality is related to
culture and will change when culture changes. No particular
metaethical claim about cultural relativism is being advanced,
however. 23 Philosophical analysis may reveal a particular morality to
21. EMILE DURKHEIM, SUICIDE: A STUDY IN SOCIOLOGY (John Spaulding & George Simpson
trans., Free Press 1979) (1952). For an analysis of Durkheim's work on suicide, see STEVEN
LUKES, EMILE DURKHEIM: His LIFE AND WORKS: A HISTORICAL AND CRITICAL STUDY 191-225
(Stanford Univ. Press 2d ed. 1985) (1973).
22. DURKHEIM, supra note 21, at 261, 263.
23. For general discussions of this subject, see ESSAYS ON MORAL REALISM (Geoffrey Sayre-
McCord ed., 1986); GILBERT HARMAN & JUDITH JARVIS THOMPSON, MORAL RELATIVISM AND
MORAL OBJECTIVITY (1996); GILBERT HARMAN, THE NATURE OF MORALITY: AN INTRODUCTION TO
ETHICS (1977); STEVEN LUKES, MORAL RELATIVISM: BIG IDEAS/SMALL BOOKS (2008); J.L.
MACKIE, ETHICS: INVENTING RIGHT AND WRONG (1977); MORAL RELATIVISM: A READER (Paul K.
Moser & Thomas L. Carson eds., 2000).
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be the one that all rational beings should follow, 24 but that would not
contradict the observation that the actual moral systems people have
adopted over the course of Western history-perhaps because they
were irrational or unenlightened-have changed with changing times,
an observation that, as will be shown below, is empirically
demonstrable.
A. The Classical Morality of Honor
The classical or Greco-Roman era was a long and complex
period, as long as or longer than the Medieval, Renaissance,
Reformation, Enlightenment, and Modern periods which followed, 25
and itself displays great variations of moral attitudes. But one major
aspect of Greco-Roman morality that persisted over time is the
morality of honor. Honor lies at the center of the virtues that were
celebrated by classical society. 26 It appears to be the dominant
morality of the Homeric era and plays a significant, if not exclusive,
role in the more sophisticated moral thinking of the succeeding eras. 27
According to this moral system, one's position in society was
determined by one's status, and status, even if originally conferred by
birth, is maintained by preservation of one's honor.28 Because of its
24. See generally Richard Boyd, How to be a Moral Realist, in ESSAYS ON MORAL REALISM,
supra note 23, at 181; MATrHEW KRAMER, MORAL REALISM AS A MORAL DOCTRINE (2009);
MICHAEL MOORE, PLACING BLAME: A GENERAL THEORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAw (1998); RUSS
SCHAFER-LANDAU, MORAL REALISM: A DEFENSE (2005). This is certainly our general attitude
toward science. Although many people subscribe to the idea that modern science has an objective
validity that prior efforts fail to achieve, very few would dispute the observation that the
scientific theories of these prior eras are the product of each era's culture, or even that our
theories, such as General Relativity or evolutionary biology, can be linked to distinctive features
of our culture. The argument would be that our culture has equipped us to grasp certain
scientific truths in a way that prior cultures did not.
25. Periodization is often controversial. The period from the Middle Ages to contemporary
times is about 1000 years, but the period from the formation of the Greek city-states to the fall of
Rome was about 1300 years. See generally MICHAEL GRANT, THE RISE OF THE GREEKS (1988)
(discussing the beginning of Greco-Roman civilization); PETER HEATHER, THE FALL OF THE
ROMAN EMPIRE: A NEW HISTORY OF ROME AND THE BARBARIANS (2006). Since what used to be
called the Dark Ages is now called the Early Middle Ages, that 500 years might be added to the
postclassical era, but one can also date the classical era back 500 years to Mycenaean times. See
generally JEAN-PIERRE VERNANT, THE ORIGINS OF GREEK THOUGHT (1962).
26. For classic statements of the ancient world's virtue ethics generally, see Aristotle,
Nicomachean Ethics (W.D. Ross, trans.), in THE WORKS OF ARISTOTLE 339 (Robert Maynard
Hutchins ed., 1952); PLATO, THE REPUBLIC (Allan Bloom trans., 1968). See ALISDAIR MACINTYRE,
AFTER VIRTUE 121-64 (2d ed. 1984); VERNANT, supra note 25, at 82-90.
27. M.I. FINLEY, THE WORLD OF ODYSSEUS 114-54 (1965); JOINT ASS'N OF CLASSICAL
TEACHERS, THE WORLD OF ATHENS 134-42 (1984); MACINTYRE, supra note 26, at 121-45.
28. WILLIAM MILLER, BLOODTAKING AND PEACEMAKING: FEUD, LAW, AND SOCIETY IN SAGA
ICELAND 26-41 (1990) (discussing the development of "status, rank, and the economy of honor").
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link to status, honor was intrinsically hierarchical; one gained honor
by showing respect and loyalty to powerful superiors, such as the king,
and also by being generous and protective toward one's inferiors,
particularly one's dependents. At the same time, honor was an
essentially individualized possession. It involved one's personal
reputation, one's position in the eyes of others. This reputation was
based on courage, fortitude, and dignity; it could be damaged by
another's disrespect and restored only by canceling that disrespect
through some socially acknowledged means, such as punishing its
author. 29 Ultimately, honor was regarded as being the purpose of life.
In honor-based societies, as M.I. Finley notes, "[e]very value, every
judgment, every action, all skills and talents have the function of
either defining honor or realizing it."30
The relationship between honor and death was well
established: honor was more important. Finley goes on to say: "The
Homeric heroes loved life fiercely, as they did and felt everything with
passion, and no less martyr-like characters could be imagined; but
even life must surrender to honor. . . . [A]t the call of honor they
obeyed the code of the hero without flinching and without
complaining."31 This relationship applied to suicide as well as death in
battle. Perhaps the most famous suicide in Greek mythology is Ajax,
who succumbs to an uncontrollable rage when Agamemnon awards
Achilles's armor to Odysseus thus directly dishonoring Ajax, and
resolves to murder the entire Hellenic army in their sleep. Athena
saves the Hellenes by turning Ajax insane, so that he slaughters their
cattle and sheep instead. When he comes to his senses, he realizes
that his madness has resulted in a greater loss of honor than
Agamemnon's decision did, and kills himself by falling on his sword. 32
In Sophocles's play, Menelaus refuses to give Ajax a proper burial
because he tried to murder the Hellenes, not because he committed
suicide.33
This approach to suicide persisted throughout the classical
period. Plutarch clearly regarded suicide as a virtue when its purpose
29. See WILLIAM MILLER, HUMILIATION AND OTHER ESSAYS ON HONOR, SOCIAL
DISCOMFORT, AND VIOLENCE 83-87 (1993) (describing the restorative quality of retribution). As
Miller observes: "To simplify greatly, honor is that disposition which makes one act to shame
others who have shamed oneself, to humiliate others who have humiliated oneself." Id.
30. FINLEY, supra note 27, at 121.
31. Id.
32. 2 ROBERT GRAVES, THE GREEK MYTHS 321-25 (1960). The event does not appear in the
Iliad, since it occurs after the death of Achilles.
33. SOPHOCLES, AJAX, IN ELECTRA AND OTHER PLAYS 17, 54 (E.F. Watling trans., 1953).
Through the efforts of Teucer, his half-brother, and of Odysseus, Ajax receives a proper burial.
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was to preserve a person's honor. To flee from death by being carried
around by one's servants was undignified and dishonorable; to
welcome death by taking poison, to take refuge "at a mightier altar,"
was an act of admirable courage. The Stoics, Plutarch's
contemporaries, continue this theme, although modifying it into the
more refined or sophisticated notion of dignity, and are even more
explicit in their support for suicide. 34 According to Marcus Aurelius, if
one cannot maintain virtues such as rationality and equanimity,
"depart at once from life, not in passion, but with simplicity and
freedom and modesty, after doing this one laudable thing at least in
thy life, to have gone out of it thus."3 5 At other points, his Stoicism
leads him to an almost casual approach to suicide. "But it is not worth
while to live, if [right actions] cannot be done. -- Take thy departure
then from life contentedly, just as he dies who is in full activity, and
well pleased too with the things which are obstacles."36 Cicero, the
Roman statesman, orator, and Stoic philosopher expresses a similar
sentiment: "It is the appropriate action to live when most of what one
has is in accordance with nature. When the opposite is the case, or is
envisaged to be so, then the appropriate action is to depart from life." 3 7
Epictetus, perhaps the leading Stoic thinker of the era,38 is reported to
have said:
[R]emember that the door is open. Do not be a greater coward than the children, but do
as they do. Children, when things do not please them, say, 'I will not play any more'; so,
when things seem to you to reach that point, just say, 'I will not play any more,' and so
depart, instead of staying to make moan.
3 9
This is not to suggest that the ancient world uniformly favored
suicide. A recurrent countertheme is that suicide is a dereliction of
duty; by depriving the state of one of its members, it represents a
34. For more information on Stoicism generally, see TAD BRENNAN, THE STOIC LIFE:
EMOTIONS, DUTIES AND FATE (Oxford Press 2d ed., 2007) (2005); THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO
THE STOICS (Brad Inwood ed., 2003); F.H. SANDBACH, THE STOICS (1975). Imperial Roman ethics
and religion were highly pluralistic, but Stoicism was probably the leading ethical system of the
early Empire.
35. The Meditations of Marcus Aurelius Antonious (G. Long trans.), in THE STOIC AND
EPICUREAN PHILOSOPHERS 491, 8, at 564 (Whitney J. Oates ed., 1940) [hereinafter Oates].
36. Id. 47, at 550.
37. CICERO, ON MORAL ENDS 84 (Raphael Woolf trans., Julia Annas ed., 2004). Like many
philosophers, however, Cicero did not follow his own advice. As Plutarch reports, he was
captured and executed by Octavian's soldiers while attempting to hide. PLUTARCH, supra note
16, at 722-23; see ANTHONY EVERITT, CICERO: THE LIFE AND TIMES OF ROME'S GREATEST
POLITICIAN 315-19 (2003).
38. See generally A.A. LONG, EPICTETUS: A STOIC AND SOCRATIC GUIDE TO LIFE (2002).
39. ARRIAN, DISCOURSES OF EPICTETUS (P.E. Matheson trans.), in Oates, supra note 35, at
223, 266. Epictetus did not write anything himself. Arrian's Discourses are assumed to record his
teachings accurately; if not, then they record the thoughts of Arrian. Id. at 223.
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wrong against the community. It would appear to be on this ground
that suicide was illegal in the Roman Empire, since the penalty
imposed was the forfeiture of the suicide's property to the state.40 Both
Plato and Aristotle condemn suicide, but Aristotle's condemnation is
tepid and Plato's circumscribed. Aristotle states: "[H]e who through
anger voluntarily stabs himself does this contrary to right reason, and
this the law does not allow; therefore he is acting unjustly. But
towards whom? Surely towards the state, not towards himself."41 This
passage from the Ethics sounds more like an explanation of an odd
law than an ethical condemnation. Plato condemns suicide but
recognizes exceptions for a person acting under state command,
suffering from an "excruciating and unavoidable misfortune," or
falling into "some irremediable disgrace that he cannot live with."
Plato reserves his condemnation for someone who "imposes this unjust
judgment on himself in a spirit of slothful and abject cowardice." 42
Despite the disapproving tone, the exceptions Plato recognizes are so
broad that they amount to a virtual endorsement of the practice, while
his condemnation is so qualified that it is almost a nullity-after all,
almost any action taken "in a spirit of slothful and abject cowardice"
would merit moral condemnation. 43
B. The Christian Morality of Higher Purposes
Christianity replaced the morality of honor with what can be
called a morality of higher purposes. While the transition from the
Greco-Roman morality of honor to the Christian morality of higher
purposes was far from unidirectional or well defined, 44 the new
40. Daniel M. Crone, Historical Attitudes Toward Suicide, 35 DUQ. L. REV. 7, 14-16 (1996).
41. Aristotle, supra note 26, *1138a, at 1796.
42. Plato, Laws (Trevor Sanders trans.), in PLATO: COMPLETE WORKS 1318 § 873c-d, at
1532 (John M. Copper trans., 1997). In excusing suicide under state command, Plato is certainly
thinking of Socrates. See Plato, Crito (G.M.A. Grube trans.), in PLATO: COMPLETE WORKS, supra,
at 37. The penalties Plato would impose on suicides all relate to the mode of their burial. Id.
43. Plato, Laws (Trevor Sanders trans.), in PLATO: COMPLETE WORKS, supra note 42, §
873d, at 1532.
44. The preexisting, Greco-Roman morality of Western society survived well into the
Christian era, diluting the impact of the new religion. See generally ROBIN LANE FOX, PAGANS
AND CHRISTIANS (1986). Moreover, the barbarian invasions meant that a new population of
pagans had to be converted to Christianity. See ROGER COLLINS, EARLY MEDIEVAL EUROPE 300-
1000, at 179-86, 234-61, 385-89 (2d ed. 1999); PATRICK J. GEARY, BEFORE FRANCE AND
GERMANY: THE CREATION AND TRANSFORMATION OF THE MEROVINGIAN WORLD 171-78, 214-18
(1988); J.M. WALLACE-HADRILL, THE FRANKISH CHURCH (1983). During the intervening period,
which resembled the Greek Dark Ages when the Greco-Roman morality of honor took shape, a
new morality of honor emerged, under the name of chivalry. See generally GEORGES DUBY, THE
CHIVALROUS SOCIETY (Cynthia Postan trans., 1980); MAURICE KEEN, CHIVALRY (1984). It was
only in the High Middle Ages that Europe was fully re-Christianized through the Gregorian
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morality was well established by the beginning of the High Middle
Ages. Rather than defining morality in terms of personal attributes
and comportment, Christian transcendentalism saw morality as both
a means of salvation and an indication that one was going to be saved.
This morality involved a rejection of the material world, as Max Weber
noted in his pathbreaking study, The Sociology of Religion.45 The
world, from the perspective of such world-rejection religions,
is full of temptations, not only because it is the site of sensual pleasures which are
ethically irrational and completely diverting from things divine, but even more because
it fosters in the religiously average person complacent self-sufficiency and self-
righteousness in the fulfillment of common obligations, at the expense of a uniquely
necessary concentration on active achievements leading to salvation. 46
But the morality that formed an integral part of the Christian
religion possessed a positive as well as a negative dimension. It
counseled not only an ascetic rejection of worldly pleasures but also an
affirmative ethos that human action should be directed toward higher
purposes. These purposes were both individual and collective;
individually, each person should direct his actions to achieving or
accepting personal salvation,47 while collectively, people should create
a social and political environment that facilitated such individual
action.48 Both the source and content of the actions that would produce
this desirable effect were a matter of considerable controversy. During
the Middle Ages, theologians debated whether either reason or faith
Reforms,, the Peace of God movement, and the new monastic orders. See generally H.E.J.
COWDREY, THE CLUNIACS AND THE GREGORIAN REFORM (1970); HANS MAYER, THE CRUSADES
(John Gillingham, trans., 2d ed., 1988); THE PEACE OF GOD: SOCIAL VIOLENCE AND RELIGIOUS
RESPONSE IN FRANCE AROUND THE YEAR 1000 (Thomas Head & Richard Landes eds., 1992); R.W.
SOUTHERN, THE MAKING OF THE MIDDLE AGES (1953).
45. 1 MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 541-76 (Guenther Roth & Claus Wittich eds.)
(1978).
46. Id. at 542.
47. 1 THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA 819-77, 996-1001 (Fathers of the English
Dominican Province trans., 1981); JOHN DUNS SCOTUS, ON THE WILL AND MORALITY 237-92
(Allan Wolter trans., William A. Frank ed., 1997); WILLIAM OF OCKHAM, PHILOSOPHICAL
WRITINGS (Philotheus Boehner trans., 1964) [hereinafter PHILOSOPHICAL WRITINGS]; WILLIAM OF
OCKHAM, ON THE VIRTUES 111-19 (Rega Wood trans., 1997). See generally 2 FREDERICK
COPLESTON, A HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY: AUGUSTINE TO SCOTUS 398-411, 545-51 (1993); Mark D.
Jordan, Theology and Philosophy, in THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO AQUINAS 232, 232-47
(Norman Kretzmann & Eleonore Stump eds., 1993). Aquinas incorporated, or at least attempted
to incorporate, the Aristotelian concept of virtue into his system, but redefined virtue so that it is
infused by God, rather than being developed by habit, and so that it has God as its object.
AQUINAS, supra, at 851-53.
48. AQUINAS, supra note 47, at 993-1025; WILLIAM OF OCKHAM, ON THE POWER OF
EMPERORS AND POPES 87-98, 113-14 (Annabel S. Brett trans., 1998); see A.S. MCGRADE, THE
POLITICAL THOUGHT OF WILLIAM OF OCKHAM: PERSONAL AND INSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES 48-74
(1974); Antony Black, The Individual and Society, in THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF MEDIEVAL
POLITICAL THOUGHT c.350-c.1450, at 588 (J.H. Burns ed., 1988).
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was a sufficient source by itself, and whether the required actions
consisted of actions that produced results, actions based on good
intentions, or a combination of the two. 4 9 Reformation thinkers failed
to resolve these controversies but did succeed in adding others.
Human beings are saved by faith alone, they argued, not by good
works, however well intentioned, although they tended to revive good
works as an emblem of true faith.50 One constant throughout all these
controversies, however, is that people must obey divine commands and
act in ways directed toward their individual salvation and the
salvation of their fellow human beings.
This morality of higher purposes generated a complicated set of
attitudes toward death. The early Christian Church did not take a
definitive position on suicide,5' and there is no explicit prohibition of
suicide in the Old or New Testaments.52 The Christian prohibition of
suicide developed over time as a result of both pragmatic and moral
concerns. The martyrdoms that were so central to Christianity's self-
conception were often close to voluntary self-destruction. 5 3 St.
Polycarp, according to Eusebius, allowed himself to be arrested,
responded to the threat of wild beasts and fire with equanimity, and
49. PHILOSOPHICAL WRITINGS, supra note 47, at 109-25, 160-63; JOHN DUNS SCOTUS,
PHILOSOPHICAL WRITINGS 133-62 (Allan Wolter trans., 1962); see DAVID LUSCOMBE, MEDIEVAL
THOUGHT 52-56 (1997); John Haldane, Medieval and Renaissance Ethics, in A COMPANION TO
ETHICS 133 (Peter Singer ed., 1993).
50. MARTIN LUTHER, ON THE BONDAGE OF THE WILL (J.I. Packer & O.R. Johnson trans.,
1957); see HEIKO A. OBERMAN, LUTHER: MAN BETWEEN GOD AND THE DEVIL (1989); BERNARD M.
G. REARDON, RELIGIOUS THOUGHT IN THE REFORMATION (2d ed. 1995); W.P. STEPHENS, ZWINGLI:
AN INTRODUCTION TO HIS THOUGHT (1992); FRANCOIS WENDEL, CALVIN: ORIGINS AND
DEVELOPMENT OF HIS RELIGIOUS THOUGHT (Philip Mairet trans., 1997). Biblical sources for
basing salvation on works are Matthew 25:34-40; Mark 10:21; and Luke 16:19-31. See also
James 2:14-26. Biblical sources for basing salvation on faith alone come primarily from St. Paul.
See Romans 1:17-18; Colossians 1:4-24.
51. Crone, supra note 40, at 17.
52. There are a number of Biblical stories in which a person commits suicide, asks to die, or
takes action leading directly to death. Some of these persons are portrayed as good, for example,
Samson, Judges 16:29-30, and Saul, 1 Samuel 31:4-6, while other are portrayed as evil, for
example, Ahithophel, 2 Samuel 17:1-23, and, of course, Judas, Matthew 27:5. No explicit
statement about suicide itself is provided.
53. The policy of the Roman government was not only to tolerate, but to actually encourage
all religions, and demanded only that the Empire's inhabitants include sacrifices to the imperial
cult among their rituals. Persecutions against Christians were based on their refusal to conduct
these sacrifices, but most Roman officials had little taste for such an enterprise, and begged the
Christians to relent. See Fox, supra note 44, at 419-92. Eusebius provides similar accounts:
The proconsul tried to dissuade [the Christian], stressing his youth and begging him
as one still in the very prime of life to spare himself; but without a moment's
hesitation he drew the savage beast towards him, wellnigh forcing and goading it on,
the more quickly to escape from their wicked, lawless, life.
EUSEBIUS, HISTORY OF THE CHURCH: FROM CHRIST TO CONSTANTINE 169 (G.A. Williamson trans.,
1965).
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stood willingly upon the pyre.6 4 The appeal of martyrdom was that it
was said to absolve all sins and provide immediate entry to Heaven,
where the martyr's rewards were a hundred times greater than those
of an ordinary Christian.55 This created the pragmatic danger of mass
suicides. The reversal of Greco-Roman attitudes on the subject can
thus be seen as the necessary consequence of a religion that portrayed
the afterlife as a glorious reward, rather than a dreary shadow
world.56
There is, however, a deeper explanation that lies in the
underlying shift in moral attitudes.57 Because Christianity's dominant
morality was that human action must serve higher purposes, rather
than individual honor, suicide was rejected as a selfish act that did not
serve the purposes that God prescribed for human beings.58
Translating into transcendental terms Aristotle's notion that suicide
was a wrong against the community, Christian thinkers argued that
people had a moral obligation to remain alive and endure whatever
miseries confronted them. 59 Moreover, Thomas Aquinas insisted that
decisions of life and death "belong[] to God alone."6 0 The closely related
act of welcomed martyrdom was distinguished as serving divine
purposes.
This condemnation of suicide became more intense by the time
of the High Middle Ages. Dante's enthusiasm for inflicting eternal
punishment on a man who had so little reason to live is characteristic
of the era.61 When Joan of Arc, imprisoned in the tower of Beaurevoir
54. Eusebius, supra note 53, at 168-74.
55. FOX, supra note 44, at 419. See generally id. at 419-92.
56. St. Augustine, the most important theorist of the early Church, confronts this issue
directly. 1 Aurelius Augustine, The City of God, in THE WORKS OF AURELIUS AUGUSTINE, BISHOP
OF HIPPO 1, 38-39 (Marcus Dods trans., 1993). His answer is that suicide itself is a grievous sin,
which is circular but, at least in his case, heartfelt. Id.
57. See HEINRICH FICHTENAU, LIVING IN THE TENTH CENTURY: MENTALITIES AND SOCIAL
ORDERS 245-332 (Patrick J. Geary trans., 1991); TOM HOLLAND, THE FORGE OF CHRISTENDOM:
THE END OF DAYS AND THE EPIC RISE OF THE WEST 223-64 (2008); JACQUES LE GOFF, THE
MEDIEVAL IMAGINATION 67-77 (Arthur Goldhammer trans., 1988).
58. See AQUINAS, supra note 47, at 1465-70; Augustine, supra note 56, at 25-36. Augustine
grounds his argument in the Decalogue's prohibition "Thou shalt not kill," and Aquinas follows
him. But this obviously requires interpretation, which in this case is guided by the sense that life
has higher purposes prescribed by God.
59. AQUINAS, supra note 47, at 1463; Augustine, supra note 56, at 32-36. Aquinas quotes
Aristotle on this point; although he endorses Aristotle's secular argument that suicide wrongs
the community, he quickly proceeds to the argument that judgment about life and death "belongs
to God alone." AQUINAS, supra note 47, at 1469. See ERNST KANTOROWICZ, THE KING'S TWO
BODIES: A STUDY IN MEDIAEVAL POLITICAL THEOLOGY 269 (1957), for the sense of connection
between these two principles that pervaded High Medieval thought.
60. AQUINAS, supra note 47, at 1469.
61. See supra text accompanying notes 19-20.
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by John of Luxembourg, learned that she was about to be sold to the
English, she leapt from the tower in an attempt to escape. She was
knocked unconscious by her fall and thus recaptured, but she suffered
no other damage and was fully recovered in short order. At her trial,
much was made of the fact that jumping from the tower-the distance
to the ground was about forty feet-was a suicide attempt, thus
confirming her evil nature. 62 Her accusers suspected her of intending
to commit this grievous sin although she was facing almost certain
execution if she remained a prisoner, although jumping out of an open
window is a fairly obvious means of escape, and although she had
actually survived the jump without serious injury.63
The Catholic Church, of course, has not retracted this position
in the modern era. 64 Rather, it has set itself in opposition to the moral
changes that have accompanied the advent of modernity. Papal
encyclicals combine the repetition of the Church's premodern morality
with condemnations of the current beliefs and practices that will be
described below. 65 There is nothing surprising about this, however.
Moral transformations, unlike political revolutions, do not happen all
at once, and it is standard, not unusual, for a powerfully stated and
widely accepted morality to continue into the following era.
Reverberations of the morality of honor can be found throughout the
medieval period,66 and the morality of higher purposes continues to
command many people's loyalty in the current one. Indeed, the
gradualness of the transition and the simultaneous existence of two
62. MARINA WARNER, JOAN OF ARC: THE IMAGE OF FEMALE HEROISM 112-14 (1981).
63. Of course, the English were not conducting a fair trial, but looking for reasons to
execute her. Thus, they simultaneously charged that if she had not intended to kill herself, she
must have jumped because her voices told her she could fly, which was clearly the work of the
devil. DESMOND SEWARD, THE HUNDRED YEARS WAR: THE ENGLISH IN FRANCE 1337-1453, at
213-22 (1978); WARNER, supra note 62, at 114. Still, they were in a highly charged political
situation, and had to devise plausible-sounding charges.
64. U.S. CATHOLIC CONF., CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH 549-50 (1994).
65. JOHN PAUL II, EVANGELIUM VITAE: ON THE VALUE AND INVIOLABILITY OF HUMAN LIFE
64-66 (1995) (condemnation of assisted suicide); id. 15, 46-47, 71 (condemnation of
modern morality passim); Pope Pius XI, Casti Connubii (Dec. 31, 1930) (condemnation of modern
morality); see Father Robert Barry, The Catholic Condemnation ofRational Suicide, in JAMES L.
WERTH, JR., CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVES ON RATIONAL SUICIDE 29 (1999).
66. One example is dueling. Characteristic of the morality of honor, it was condemned by
European monarchs, see ROBERT BARTLETT, TRIAL BY FIRE AND WATER: THE MEDIEVAL JUDICIAL
ORDEAL 109, 120-25 (1986); I.W.S. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 308-14 (1956),
and yet persisted throughout the second millennium. See ERIC JAGER, THE LAST DUEL (2004);
GEORGE NIELSON, TRIAL BY COMBAT 167-201 (1890); BERTRAM WYATT-BROWN, THE SHAPING OF
SOUTHERN CULTURE: HONOR, GRACE, AND WAR, 1760s-1990s (2001). The most famous duel in
American history was fought between Alexander Hamilton and Aaron Burr, see infra note 72,
but it was not the only one involving famous people. Andrew Jackson challenged John Sevier to a
duel two years before, see H.W. BRANDS, ANDREW JACKSON: HIS LIFE AND TIMES 105-10 (2005).
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distinct moralities are responsible for many of our social conflicts, as
will be described below.
C. The Modern Morality of Self-Fulfillment
The late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries saw still
another transformation of Europe's moral system as a result of the
momentous changes stemming from the industrial revolution, the
advent of the administrative state, and the development of systematic
natural and social science. What emerged, although neither fully
formed nor fully recognized for another century, can be described as a
morality of self-fulfillment. 67 Its central idea is modern individualism:
each person should be able to lead a life that makes use of her
distinctive abilities and satisfies her particular aspirations and
desires.68 In other words, human action should not be directed toward
a uniform ethos of achieving honor or toward higher purposes
prescribed by a transcendental religion, but rather toward self-defined
goals that will provide the most subjectively satisfying life.6 9
The intellectual origins and ramifications of this moral system
are too complex to trace in this discussion, but one obvious and
essential component is the shift from a religious to a psychological
concept of human well-being, and of life's meaning in general. While
part of the general secularization of Western civilization that has been
occurring since the Renaissance, the shift toward psychology
represents a distinctive theme in modern society. Its greatest
champion was Freud, who redefined subjective discomfort with
sexuality from a salutary transcendental warning to a dysfunctional
67. A variant of this description appears in Edward Rubin, Sex, Politics, and Morality, 47
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1 (2005).
68. See HANNAH ARENDT, BETWEEN PAST AND FUTURE 17-40 (1954); EMILE DURKHEIM, THE
DIVISION OF LABOR IN SOCIETY 191-95 (W.D. Halls trans., 1984); 1 JURGEN HABERMAS, THE
THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION: REASON AND THE RATIONALIZATION OF SOCIETY (Thomas
McCarthy trans., 1984); NIKLAS LUHMANN, THE DIFFERENTIATION OF SOCIETY (Stephen Holmes
& Charles Larmore trans., 1982); J.B. SCHNEEWIND, THE INVENTION OF AUTONOMY: A HISTORY
OF MODERN MORAL PHILOSOPHY (1998); MAX WEBER, THE PROTESTANT ETHIC AND THE SPIRIT OF
CAPITALISM (Talcott Parsons trans., 1958).
69. Gewirth distinguishes between these two modes of self-fulfillment, identifying them as
aspiration-fulfillment and capacity-fulfillment. ALAN GEWIRTH, SELF FULFILLMENT 13-18 (1998).
While the two notions are theoretically distinguishable, as Gewirth suggests, they are connected
both psychologically and sociologically in the modern world. Id. Psychologically, people's
capacities tend to determine their aspirations, both because the modern world's social mobility
encourages talented people to aim high and because its competitiveness and relative lack of
entrenched privilege cautions less talented people to be realistic. Sociologically, the modern
world allows for a wide range of roles, ideologies, and life experiences, allowing individuals to
construct their aspirations and develop their capacities as part of a unified experience of
maturation. The result is a unified ethos centered on the general concept of self-fulfillment.
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mental affliction. 70 The response that follows from this redefinition is
therapy, not prayer-that is, an effort to eliminate the sense of
discomfort rather than to suppress the underlying desire.71 This
equation of ontological well-being with somatic well-being-the term
"mental health" being indicative and distinctly modern-reflects an
ethos which excludes higher purposes and defines human goals in
individualistic terms.
From the perspective of the preexisting morality of higher
purposes, self-fulfillment may not seem like a morality at all, but
rather like the absence of morality. However, like the Greco-Roman
morality of honor or the Christian morality of higher purposes, it
provides comprehensive criteria for people's relationships with each
other, as well as for their understanding of themselves. It generates
the political principle that each person should be allowed as much
freedom of action as she can exercise without impinging on the efforts
of others to achieve self-fulfillment. But it also extends to more
personal principles that we place beyond the reach of politics, such as
an obligation to provide others with assistance in their efforts to fulfill
themselves. Just as Greco-Roman morality subordinated the
continuation of life to its master value of honor and Christian morality
subordinated it to the service of higher purposes, modern morality
subordinates life's continuation to personal self-fulfillment. For the
most part, life is to be preserved at nearly all costs; for individuals to
fulfill themselves, it is generally necessary for them to be alive.
Modern morality is thus more solicitous of life than either of its
predecessors. It views the sacrifice of life for honor as jejune and
wasteful pride, and perhaps-since it is the first moral system to
assert the equality of men and women-as testosterone-driven male
70. On Freud generally, see PETER GAY, FREUD: A LIFE FOR OUR TIME (1998); TONY
THWAITES, READING FREUD: PSYCHOANALYSIS AS CULTURAL THEORY (2007). At present, the
scientific validity of Freud's theories is a matter of controversy. See generally ALLEN ESTERSON,
SEDUCTIVE MIRAGE: AN EXPLORATION OF THE WORK OF SIGMUND FREUD (1993); SEYMOUR
FISHER & ROGER GREENBERG, FREUD SCIENTIFICALLY REAPPRAISED: TESTING THE THEORIES AND
THERAPY (1996); JOHN FORRESTER, DISPATCHES FROM THE FREUD WARS: PSYCHOANALYSIS AND
ITS PASSIONS (1997). But the impact of Freud on Western culture is vast and incontestable. See
generally ILHAM DILMAN, FREUD AND HUMAN NATURE (1983); PHILIP MANNING, FREUD AND
AMERICAN SOCIOLOGY (2005); THWAITES, supra.
71. See generally MARTIN L. GROSS, THE PSYCHOLOGICAL SOCIETY: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF
PSYCHIATRY, PSYCHOTHERAPY, PSYCHOANALYSIS AND THE PSYCHOLOGICAL REVOLUTION (1978);
CHRISTOPHER LASCH, THE CULTURE OF NARCISSISM: AMERICAN LIFE IN AN AGE OF DIMINISHING
EXPECTATIONS (1979); EVA MOSKOWITZ, IN THERAPY WE TRUST: AMERICA'S OBSESSION WITH
SELF-FULFILLMENT (2001); PHILIP RIEFF, THE TRIUMPH OF THE THERAPEUTIC: USES OF FAITH
AFTER FREUD (1987); RICHARD SENNETT, THE FALL OF PUBLIC MAN (1986). The negative tone of
these studies reflects the general discomfort with the moral transformation of the modern era
and the desire to judge the new morality in terms of the old.
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display behavior. 72  It views martyrdom as a fetishistic and
unnecessary response to duress. What is important is to lead a life
that is fulfilling in its entirety and that meets the individual's goals,
aspirations, and desires. If some insult to one's honor or compelled
violation of one's religion is so disturbing that it impedes one's ability
to lead a fulfilling life, one should go into therapy to rid oneself of this
obsession. 73
According to the morality of self-fulfillment, suicide is an
appropriate, though not obligatory, response when there is no further
possibility of living a fulfilling life. Whether such a possibility exists is
always a subjective judgment by the individual. In some cases, the
circumstances that produce this situation are observable by another
person, as when the individual is suffering from a painful and soon-to-
be-fatal disease.74 In other cases, these circumstances may be
apparent only to the individual, like Edward Arlington Robinson's
Richard Cory. 76 Those who are devoted to a person may feel profound
72. Consider a famous incident of death for honor in American history-the duel between
Alexander Hamilton and Aaron Burr. Its late date-dueling had been illegal in virtually all
Western countries for hundreds of years-betrays it as an atavism, a holdover from a prior era
that had survived among a narrow social class. The dispute centered on the single word
"despicable" that Hamilton was reported in a newspaper to have applied to Burr's behavior. Burr
demanded that Hamilton retract the word, which he had probably never used in the first place,
but Hamilton refused out of a sense of wounded honor and goaded Burr into challenging him.
Having done so, he decided to throw away his first shot as further proof of his honor. At the time,
Burr (whom Hamilton knew to be an expert marksman) gunned him down. Hamilton was the
primary source of support for his sickly wife and six children - and there would have been
seven, except his eldest son had been killed in exactly the same manner one year before. See RON
CHERNOW, ALEXANDER HAMILTON 650-55, 680-709 (2004).
73. The antiheroic, egalitarian, individualistic character of modern times is widely noted,
most often in negative terms. See generally GERTRUDE HIMMELFARB, THE DE-MORALIZATION OF
SOCIETY: FROM VICTORIAN VIRTUES TO MODERN VALUES (1994); LASCH, supra note 71;
MOSKOWITZ, supra note 71; SENNETT, supra note 71. For more balanced, less disconsolate
accounts, see ANTHONY GIDDENS, THE TRANSFORMATION OF INTIMACY: SEXUALITY, LOVE AND
EROTICISM IN MODERN SOCIETIES (1992); ANTHONY GIDDENS, MODERNITY AND SELF-IDENTITY:
SELF AND SOCIETY IN THE LATE MODERN AGE (1991); CHARLES TAYLOR, SOURCES OF THE SELF:
THE MAKING OF THE MODERN IDENTITY (1989). Another perspective on the same process is
provided by discussion of the decline of religion and religious values in the modern world. See,
e.g., STEVE BRUCE, GOD IS DEAD: SECULARIZATION IN THE WEST (2002); OWEN CHADWICK, THE
SECULARIZATION OF THE EUROPEAN MIND IN THE 19TH CENTURY (1975); RONALD INGLEHART,
CULTURE SHIFT IN ADVANCED INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY (1990); CHARLES TAYLOR, A SECULAR AGE
(2007).
74. For a comprehensive analysis, see C.G. PRADO & S.J. TAYLOR, ASSISTED SUICIDE:
THEORY AND PRACTICE IN ELECTIVE DEATH (1999).
75. And he was rich-yes, richer than a king;
And admirably schooled in every grace:
In fine, we thought that he was everything
To make us wish that we were in his place.
So on we worked, and waited for the light
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sorrow at that person's suicide, but the suicide itself is not a matter
for moral condemnation. Of course, it may be condemned on the
grounds that others were dependent on the person for their own self-
fulfillment, but this is a condemnation of irresponsible action, not of
suicide per se.
The passage quoted above from Durkheim reflects the way
suicide is viewed in the new morality of self-fulfillment as clearly as
the passage from Plutarch reflects the morality of honor or the
passage from Dante reflects the morality of higher purposes. Of
course, Durkheim's discussion is sociological, not moralistic, but that
is precisely the point. According to the morality of self-fulfillment,
dysfunctional human behavior does not result from a lack of virtue or
belief, but from the interaction of large-scale social forces with the
individual. Part of the complex of cultural phenomena that both
generate and are generated by the morality of self-fulfillment is the
development of social science, 76 and the general attitude toward social
and individual behavior that this development implies. Because
individual behavior is seen as the result of social forces, the modern
response to it is not one of general approval or condemnation. Rather,
we try to intervene at the individual level to help people deal with
these forces in terms of their own values and aspirations. We try to
intervene at the social level to ameliorate the negative impact of these
forces on individuals. Durkheim, reflecting modern attitudes, ascribes
suicide to sociological forces, not to a moral failing of the individual;77
the modern response to this way of understanding suicide is therapy
for the individual and social welfare programs for society at large.
II. ASSISTED SUICIDE AND LAW
Lurking behind the dispute about assisted suicide is a clash of
conflicting moralities regarding suicide itself. Behind this, in turn, lies
a larger conflict regarding different conceptions of morality in
And went without the meat, and cursed the bread;
And Richard Cory, one calm summer night,
Went home and put a bullet through his head.
EDWIN ARLINGTON ROBINSON, COLLECTED POEMS 82 (1921).
76. See generally HOWARD BECKER & HARRY ELMER BARNES, SOCIAL THOUGHT FROM LORE
TO SCIENCE (3d ed. 1961); A.H. HALSEY, A HISTORY OF SOCIOLOGY IN BRITAIN: SCIENCE,
LITERATURE AND SOCIETY (2004); ROSCOE C. HINKLE, DEVELOPMENTS IN AMERICAN
SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY 1915-1950 (1994); DONALD MACRAILD & AVRAM TAYLOR, SOCIAL THEORY
AND SOCIAL HISTORY (2004); LOUIS MENAND, THE METAPHYSICAL CLUB: A STORY OF IDEAS IN
AMERICA 151-200 (2001).
77. DURKHEIM, supra note 21.
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general.78 The perspective offered in the preceding Part links these
attitudinal conflicts with major trends in the moral thinking of
Western society over the course of its entire development. The point is
not simply to advance a more venerable explanation than is usual in
discussing assisted suicide, but rather to suggest that basic- moral
attitudes must be viewed in the context of the historical and cultural
experience that generates them. Attitudes develop over long periods of
time and are linked with other long-developing belief systems; it is
difficult to understand their distinctive features without the
comparison afforded by an extended historical perspective.
The morality of honor is largely defunct in the Western world,
despite occasional reverberations.7 9 Our current cultural experience
involves the transition from the Christian morality of higher purposes
to the modern morality of self-fulfillment. This transition is gradual,
having been in process for at least two centuries, but it is far from
gentle. In fact, it is disturbing, painful, and vertiginous-disturbing
because we are moving from an established ethos to an emerging one,
painful because the displacement of something as basic as morality
inevitably engenders a severe sense of loss, and vertiginous because
the criteria by which we decide whether social change is good or bad
are the very things undergoing transformation.
With respect to the issue at hand, the emergence of the new
morality of self-fulfillment can be seen in the abolition of criminal
laws against suicide in every state,80 as well as in the Death with
Dignity Acts that Oregon and Washington have adopted.81 The
resistance to this new morality, and the desire to cling to its declining
predecessor, can be seen in the controversy over the Terri Schiavo
78. See JAMES D. HUNTER, CULTURE WARS: THE STRUGGLE TO DEFINE AMERICA (1991)
(attributing conflict to schisms between progressive and traditional interpretations within major
religions); GEORGE LAKOFF, MORAL POLITICS: How LIBERALS AND CONSERVATIVES THINK 65-140
(2d ed. 2002) (attributing conflict to different theories of child rearing). Lakoffs account is
essentially nonhistorical, however, while Hunter's is limited to contemporary events. This Article
is an attempt to link recent development to more extensive historical trends.
79. One such example is the Hamilton-Burr duel. See supra note 72. This occurred many
centuries after dueling, a practice that originated with the morality of honor, ceased to be a
judicial procedure. See ERIC JAGER, THE LAST DUEL: A TRUE STORY OF CRIME, SCANDAL, AND
TRIAL BY COMBAT IN MEDIEVAL FRANCE (2004) (providing historical overview of medieval judicial
duels and narrative of the last recorded judicial duel in Paris); GEORGE NIELSON, TRIAL BY
COMBAT 203, 306-07 (1890) (discussing some of the last judicial duels).
80. See Stacy Mojica & Dan S. Murrell, The Right to Choose-When Should Death Be In the
Individual's Hands?, 12 WHIITIER L. REV. 471, 487-88 (1991) (noting that while attempted
suicide was treated as a misdemeanor at common law, it is no longer a crime in any state in the
United States, though some states retain provisions stating that suicide or suicide-related
procedures are not condoned).
81. OR. REV. STAT. §§ 127.805-.885 (2005); WASH. REV. CODE § 70.245 (2008).
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case, the Bush Administration's effort to preempt the Oregon statute,
and, of course, the continued opposition to legalizing assisted suicide.
It is hardly a surprise to find that the Republican Party, which self-
identifies as conservative, tends to align itself with the traditional
morality on this issue (and other issues), while the Democratic Party,
the more liberal of the two, tends to align itself with the more modern,
emerging morality. 82
This account is purely descriptive and makes no effort to pass
normative judgments. Such judgments would be difficult to formulate
in a persuasive manner because they require a choice among the
competing moralities or the introduction of some different morality
that would possess even less traction for modern Americans. 83 But
law, and particularly constitutional law, does provide a basis to
advance judgments. The U.S. Constitution ensconces a set of
normative choices within our legal system, and these norms, as law,
are ones that our society has agreed to implement and abide by.
This Part will argue that the Establishment Clause of the U.S.
Constitution embodies a normative decision that forbids blanket
prohibitions of assisted suicide. The Establishment Clause norm, of
course, is separation of church and state. When the prohibition of
assisted suicide is viewed within the historical context described in
Part I, it can be shown to violate the Establishment Clause because it
enforces a particular religiously inspired moral choice and lacks a
countervailing secular justification. The first section of this Part
briefly describes Establishment Clause doctrine. The next section
applies that doctrine to laws prohibiting assisted suicide and shows
that these laws are properly regarded as religiously motivated. The
following section then argues that the secular justifications that have
been invoked in support of these laws are unconvincing. The final
section argues that this Establishment Clause rationale is preferable
to arguments against prohibitions of assisted suicide that are based on
a substantive due process or penumbral right to die.
82. For discussions of current political alignments, see generally THOMAS FRANK: WHAT'S
THE MATTER WITH KANSAS: How CONSERVATIVES WON THE HEART OF AMERICA (2005); LAKOFF,
supra note 78; POLITICIANS AND PARTY POLITICS (John G. Geer ed., 1998).
83. C.G. PRADO, CHOOSING TO DIE: EFFECTIVE DEATH AND MULTICULTURALISM (2008),
attempts to define the meaning of a rationally justifiable decision to commit suicide in cross-
cultural terms. His definition, however, does not free itself from culturally-grounded
perspectives, but rather incorporates a variety of those views in an effort to go beyond the
perspectives of any particular culture. Id. at 41-45, 111-34.
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A. The Establishment Clause
The meaning of the Establishment Clause, like that of so many
of the Constitution's important provisions, is highly controversial and
subject to a number of competing approaches. Even a cursory account
of Establishment Clause doctrine would require more space than this
entire Article. This section, therefore, will focus almost entirely on the
element in the doctrine that is central to my argument-the element
of coercion. 84
Establishment Clause doctrine in general centers around three
basic principles, which can be described-moving from most to least
restrictive on governmental action-as strict separation, neutrality,
and accommodation. 85 Strict separation is the principle expressed by
Everson v. Board of Education,86 the Supreme Court's first decision
applying the Establishment Clause to the states. It sees the First
Amendment as having erected a "high and impregnable" wall between
church and state87 and as creating an essentially secular
government.88 Its stringency has led to its decline in recent years89
and to its displacement by the principle of neutrality. Neutrality
84. For example, Establishment Clause doctrine includes an important antidiscrimination
principle-that legislation may not favor one religion over another. See, e.g., Larson v. Valente,
456 U.S. 228, 245-55 (1982) (laws may not distinguish between religious organizations on the
basis of the amount of support they receive from members). Because this Article discusses a
choice between a religiously motivated law and a secular law, it does not need to invoke this
aspect of the doctrine.
85. John Witte suggests that recent cases display several additional principles, which he
describes as endorsement, coercion and equal treatment. See JOHN WITTE, JR., RELIGION AND
THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL EXPERIMENT 149-84 (2000).
86. 330 U.S. 1, 15-18 (1947).
87. Id. at 18. Other decisions have also expressed this separationist view. See, e.g., Walz v.
Tax Comm'r, 397 U.S. 664 (1970) (upholding state tax exemptions for religious organizations);
Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962) (forbidding prayer in schools). See generally FRANK SORAUF,
THE WALL OF SEPARATION: THE CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS OF CHURCH AND STATE (1976)
(discussing church-state separation litigation in the mid- to latter-twentieth century and the
various positions and interpretations involved in the constitutional struggle surrounding church-
state relationships); THE WALL BETWEEN CHURCH AND STATE (Dallin Oaks ed., 1963) (providing
collection of essays on church-state relationship in America).
88. See Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 313 (Stewart, J., dissenting)
(arguing that prohibition of certain practices under strict separationist principles promotes a
"religion of secularism"); Alan Schwarz, No Imposition of Religion: The Establishment Clause
Value, 77 YALE L.J. 692, 700 (1968) (observing that denial of aid to parochial schools on strict
separationist grounds promotes a certain secular religionism). But see John C. Jeffries, Jr. &
James Ryan, A Political History of the Establishment Clause, 100 MICH. L. REV. 279 (2001)
(finding that the concept of separation was strongly motivated by anti-Catholicism and division
among various denominations).
89. See STEPHEN CARTER, THE CULTURE OF DISBELIEF: HOW AMERICAN LAW AND POLITICS
TRIVIALIZES RELIGIOUS DEVOTION (1993); Ira C. Lupu, The Lingering Death of Separationism, 62
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 230 (1994).
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forbids government from favoring one religion over another, but is
distinguishable from strict separation, at least in theory, because it
also forbids the government from favoring secularism over religion.90
It is often operationalized through the Lemon test, which provides
that a statute is constitutional only if it has a secular purpose, neither
advances nor inhibits religion as its primary effect, and does not foster
excessive government entanglement with religion.91 The Lemon test is
far from unambiguous 92 and has been severely attacked by several
members of the Court,93 but it has never been overruled and probably
remains the leading interpretation of the Establishment Clause. 94
The third principle, frequently described as accommodation,
reflects the Court's more sympathetic treatment of religion in recent
years.95 It permits the government to acknowledge and accommodate
the religious character of the American people and only invalidates
90. See Tex. Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 8-17 (1989); Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S.
388, 393-95 (1983); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 103-05 (1968). See generally Philip B.
Kurland, Of Church and State and the Supreme Court, 29 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1961); Douglas
Laycock, Formal, Substantive and Disaggregated Neutrality Toward Religion, 39 DEPAUL L.
REV. 993 (1990); Michael W. McConnell, Religious Freedom at the Crossroads, 59 U. CHI. L. REV.
115 (1992).
91. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971). Several opinions by Justice O'Connor
have suggested the separate criterion that the government may not act in a manner that
symbolically endorses a particular religion. See Capital Square Review & Advisory Bd. v.
Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 776 (1995) (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment); County of
Allegheny v. ACLU Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 627 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring in
part and in the judgment); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 679-80 (1984) (O'Connor, J.). For a
favorable assessment of this approach, see Arnold H. Loewy, Rethinking Government Neutrality
Towards Religion Under the Establishment Clause: The Untapped Potential of Justice O'Connor's
Insight, 64 N.C. L. REV. 1049 (1986). For a critique, see Steven D. Smith, Symbols, Perceptions,
and Doctrinal Illusions: Establishment Neutrality and the "No Endorsement" Test, 86 MICH. L.
REV. 266 (1987).
92. See Gary J. Simson, The Establishment Clause in the Supreme Court: Rethinking the
Court's Approach, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 905 (1987) (discussing development of Lemon test and
proposing reforms aimed at greater consistency and objectivity in application of the test).
93. See, e.g., Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 232-35 (1997) (rejecting Lemon's
entanglement criterion).
94. See Ira C. Lupu, Which Old Witch?: A Comment on Professor Paulsen's Lemon is Dead,
43 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 883, 884-89 (1993); Daniel 0. Conkle, Lemon Lives, 43 CASE W. RES. L.
REV. 865 (1993). But see Michael Stokes Paulsen, Lemon is Dead, 43 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 795
(1993).
95. See generally Arlin M. Adams & Sarah Barringer Gordon, The Doctrine of
Accommodation in the Jurisprudence of the Religion Clauses, 37 DEPAUL L. REV. 317 (1988);
Michael W. McConnell, Accommodation of Religion: An Update and a Response to the Critics, 60
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 685 (1992). The current reliance on this approach should be regarded as a
comeback rather than an innovation, since accommodationist reasoning appears in a number of
the Court's early cases. See, e.g., McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961) (upholding Sunday
closing laws); Two Guys from Harrison-Allentown, Inc. v. McGinley, 366 U.S. 582 (1961) (same);
Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952) (upholding statute granting students release time from
public school for religious study).
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laws that coerce religious activity or fail to treat different religions
equally.96 It has been advanced in several spirited dissentS97 and by
the plurality opinion in Mitchell v. Helms,98 but it does not seem to
have supplanted the neutrality test.99 The concern about a test that
takes coercion or open favoritism as its touchstone is that it would
significantly limit the Establishment Clause's current scope. 100 Many
governmental actions that are now regarded as unconstitutional, such
as direct fiscal aid to religious organizations and religious displays in
public buildings, could be deemed acceptable if this test became the
prevailing one. 101
These crosscurrents were plainly evident in Lee v. Weisman,102
probably the leading case on the applicability of a coercion principle in
Establishment Clause doctrine. The case centered on two brief prayers
that an invited clergyman offered at the graduation ceremony of a
public middle school in Providence, Rhode Island. Writing for the
majority, Justice Kennedy declined to revisit controversy over the
Court's use of the Lemon test.103 Instead, he declared, the case was
governed by the basic fact that both public pressure and peer pressure
compelled the graduating students to listen to the prayers in question.
This was sufficient, in his view, to render the prayers
unconstitutional. "It is beyond dispute that, at a minimum, the
96. In the legal academy, Michael McConnell has been the most enthusiastic advocate of
this approach. See Michael McConnell, State Action and the Supreme Court's Emerging
Consensus on the Line Between Establishment and Private Religious Expression, 28 PEPPERDINE
L. REV. 681 (2001); McConnell, supra note 95; Michael W. McConnell, Coercion: The Lost
Element of Establishment, 27 WM & MARY L. REV. 933 (1986); Michael W. McConnell,
Accommodation of Religion, 1985 SUP. CT. REV. 1.
97. See Lamb's Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 397-400
(1993) (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment); Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 631-45 (1992) (Scalia,
J., dissenting).
98. 530 U.S. 793, 801-36 (2000).
99. Some of the recent cases that were decided under the neutrality principle, however,
have a distinctly accomodationist flavor. See, e.g., Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 649-
56 (2002) (upholding school voucher program that allowed vouchers to be spent on parochial
schools); Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 113-19 (2001) (invalidating
exclusion of religious group from use of school facilities after hours).
100. See Douglas Laycock, "Nonpreferential" Aid to Religion: A False Claim About Original
Intent, 27 WM. & MARY L. REV. 875, 884-85 (1986); Mark Tushnet, The Emerging Principle of
Accommodation of Religion (Dubitante), 76 GEO. L.J. 1691, 1703-14 (1988).
101. See, e.g., Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980) (prohibiting a state from requiring that
the Ten Commandments be posted in public school buildings); Ill. ex rel. McCollum v. Bd. of
Educ. of Sch. Dist. No. 71, 333 U.S. 203 (1948) (striking down a program that provided religious
instruction on public school grounds during regular school hours for children whose parents
opted for such instruction). Both decisions, which are currently regarded as fixed points in
Establishment Clause jurisprudence, could be reversed under a coercion-only test.
102. 505 U.S. 577 (1992).
103. Id. at 586-87.
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Constitution guarantees that government may not coerce anyone to
support or participate in religion or its exercise, or otherwise act in a
way which 'establishes a [state] religion or religious faith, or tends to
do so.' "104
Justice Kennedy's decision, which prevailed by a 5-4 vote,
elicited two concurrences and a dissent. The concurrences, written by
Justices Blackmun and Souter and each joined by Justices O'Connor
and Stevens, readily agreed that coerced religious observance was a
clear violation of the Establishment Clause.105 The concern in both
concurrences was to counteract any implication in the majority
opinion that the Establishment Clause was limited to cases of
coercion. Both opinions argued that the coercion involved in Weisman
itself was an appropriate and obvious basis for invalidating the
government's action, but that there are many situations not involving
coercion where governmental action would be invalid as well.
Justice Scalia's dissenting opinion, which was joined by
Justices Rehnquist, Thomas, and White, was largely silent about
noncoercion cases, which may indicate a willingness to limit the
Establishment Clause in the manner that the concurring opinions
feared. But the opinion was in complete agreement with the majority
that coercion is constitutionally anathema. While it was written in
Justice Scalia's typically intemperate style,10 6 its disagreement with
the majority was limited to the question of whether the specific
situation in the case was actually coercive. Because the middle school
neither imposed any formal participation requirement nor any
104. Id. at 587 (quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 678 (1984)). Weisman was
reaffirmed in Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000), which involved a student-
led prayer at high school football games. Even though the prayer was offered by a student
selected by other students, not school officials, and attendance at football games was entirely
voluntary, the Court held that there was a sufficient element of coercion involved to support a
facial challenge to the practice. "Even if we regard every high school student's decision to attend
a home football game as purely voluntary, we are nevertheless persuaded that the delivery of a
pregame prayer has the improper effect of coercing those present to participate in an act of
religious worship." Id. at 312. Justice Rehnquist's dissent, joined by Justices Scalia and Thomas,
resembled Justice Scalia's Weisman dissent in that it questioned the factual basis for concluding
that coercion had occurred, but not the principle that any coerced practice would be
unconstitutional. Compare id. at 318-26 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting), with Weisman, 505 U.S. at
631-46 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
105. See, e.g., Weisman, 505 U.S. at 605 (Blackmun, J., concurring) ("There is no doubt that
attempts to aid religion through government coercion jeopardize freedom of conscience. Even
subtle pressure diminishes the right of each individual to choose voluntarily what to believe.").
106. See Edward Rubin, Question Regarding D.C. v. Heller: As a Justice, Antonin Scalia is
(A) Great, (B) Acceptable, (C) Injudicious, 54 WAYNE L. REV. 1105 (2008) (critiquing the tone of
Justice Scalia's opinion and linking it to defects in his reasoning).
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sanction for a student's failure to follow the informal norms of
participation, Justice Scalia argued that no coercion was involved. 07
For present purposes, the important point is that all the
Justices agree that coercing someone to follow the dictates of a
particular religion is unconstitutional. In the midst of the doctrinal
farrago that afflicts the Establishment Clause,108 there appears to be a
consensus that coercion is a core principle of the clause's application.
Some of the Justices might choose to limit the clause to this core and
"accommodate" noncoercive governmental action that supports
religious practices. Others-still the majority at present-extend the
clause's reach, using the Lemon test or similar criteria to include
financial support, religious displays, endorsement, and entanglement
within the ambit of its prohibition. But the clause's application to
coercive governmental action seems to be common ground.
One reason that coercion is recognized as so central to the
Establishment Clause is because this principle is functionally
connected to the closely allied Free Exercise Clause, which is centrally
concerned with coercion.109 Even more significantly, it is connected to
107. As Justice Scalia stated: 'Thus, while I have no quarrel with the Court's general
proposition that the Establishment Clause 'guarantees that government may not coerce anyone
to support or participate in religion or its exercise,' [citation omitted] I see no warrant for
expanding the concept of coercion beyond acts backed by threat of penalty . . . ." Weisman, 505
U.S. at 642. Expanding on this point, he explained:
The coercion that was a hallmark of historical establishments of religion was coercion
of religious orthodoxy and of financial support by force of law and threat of penalty.
Typically, attendance at the state church was required; only clergy of the official
church could lawfully perform sacraments; and dissenters, if tolerated, faced an array
of civil disabilities.
Id. at 640 (emphasis in original).
108. Daniel Farber, in the final chapter of his book discussing the doctrinal complexities of
the First Amendment, states: "From a lawyer's point of view, the Establishment Clause is the
most frustrating part of First Amendment law. The cases are an impossible tangle of divergent
doctrines and seemingly conflicting results." DANIEL A. FARBER, THE FIRST AMENDMENT 263
(1998).
109. See, e.g., Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993)
(striking down city ordinances that prohibited the ritual sacrifice of animals within the city
limits because these ordinances were designed to forbid one of the practices of Santeria);
Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961) (rejecting a Free Exercise claim brought by Orthodox
Jews against Pennsylvania's Sunday closing law on the ground that the law may have
disadvantaged Jews, but it was not coercive). Regarding the relationship between the two
religious clauses, see generally Jesse H. Choper, A Century of Religious Freedom, 88 CAL. L. REV.
1709 (2000) (discussing the relationship between the two religion clauses); Jesse H. Choper, The
Religion Clauses of the First Amendment: Reconciling the Conflict, 41 U. PITT. L. REV. 673 (1980)
(discussing judicial treatment of the two clauses and arguing for a reconciling principle whereby
the Establishment Clause would forbid only government action that has a solely religious
purpose and that is likely to impair religious activity by coercing or otherwise influencing
religious beliefs); Ira C. Lupu, Threading Between the Religion Clauses, 63 LAW & CONTEMP.
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the general concept of human rights at a much more organic level
than other elements of Establishment Clause doctrine. Theories of
human rights generally center around the protections afforded to
individuals against government coercion, rather than on the
government's use of resources or its symbolic behavior." 0 While
constitutional provisions, as positive law, do not necessarily demand a
theoretical justification, the interpretation of a vague and general
provision such as the Establishment Clause is greatly aided by such
theoretical support. This is not to argue that the Establishment
Clause should be limited to noncoercive government action, but only
that its application to coercive action stands on a particularly secure
footing because of the theoretical support for that interpretation that
human rights theory provides.ii'
The idea that government coercion of religious practices lies at
the center of the Establishment Clause's prohibition is further
supported by empirical considerations. Any regime that engages in
such coercion is generally regarded as an oppressive one.112 In
contrast, a number of the nations that possess the world's best human
PROBS. 439 (2000) (discussing legal treatment of religious clauses and arguing for a more
balanced, interweaving approach that takes all relevant parts of clauses into account).
110. See, e.g., MAURICE CRANSTON, WHAT ARE HUMAN RIGHTS? (1973); JACK DONNELLY,
UNIVERSAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN THEORY AND PRACTICE (1989); JOEL FEINBERG, RIGHTS, JUSTICE
AND THE BOUNDS OF LIBERTY: ESSAYS IN SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY (1980); ALAN GEWIRTH, THE
COMMUNITY OF RIGHTS (1996); JAMES NICKEL, MAKING SENSE OF HUMAN RIGHTS:
PHILOSOPHICAL REFLECTIONS ON THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS (1987);
JOSEPH RAz, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM (1986).
11. This concern with coercion underlies the strong stand that the Supreme Court has
taken against school prayer, which is probably the single most stringent and coherent line of
decisions in Establishment Clause law. See Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290
(2000) (student-led nondenominational prayer at football game); Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577
(1992) (nondenominational prayer at graduation); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985) (moment
of silence); Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963) (voluntary Bible
reading); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962) (nondenominational prayer written by school
officials). In contrast, the Court has upheld the use of prayer to open sessions of a state
legislature. See Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983). Although the opinion speaks primarily
in terms of history and tradition, there is a clear implication that no one was particularly
affected by the prayer. See id. at 795 ("the measure of constitutional adjudication is the ability
and willingness to distinguish between real threat and mere shadow" (quoting Abington, 374
U.S. at 308)). The distinction between adult state legislators and school children is best
understood in terms of implicit coercion, rather than historical tradition.
112. The United Nations' Universal Declaration of Human Rights prohibits coercion of
religious practices in Article 18, which states: "Everyone has the right to freedom of thought,
conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom,
either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or
belief in teaching, practice, worship and observance." But the Declaration contains no prohibition
on governmental financial or symbolic support of a particular religion. Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, at 71, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 1st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810
(Dec. 12, 1948).
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rights records have established churches, thus providing both
financial and symbolic support to a particular religion.113 Again, this
does not mean that the Establishment Clause in the American
Constitution should not be more broadly interpreted. In light of our
history of secular government and religious pluralism, separation of
church and state is clearly an important principle in our particular
political tradition. But our history confirms, even more decisively, the
centrality of the concern about coerced religious observance. The
Framers were acutely aware that Europe had been convulsed by two
centuries of almost continuous and often devastating religious
conflict. 114 As heirs of the Enlightenment, and perhaps full-fledged
members,115 they shared the Enlightenment conviction that such
conflict was inevitable as long as governments attempted to impose a
single religion on confessionally diverse populations.116 This insight
113. Denmark, Costa Rica, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, Switzerland, and the United
Kingdom, all of which have established churches (Switzerland at the canton level) regularly rank
among the leading nations in the world on the Freedom House tabulation of human rights
performance, which is widely cited. See FREEDOM HOUSE, FREEDOM IN THE WORLD: COMBINED
AVERAGE RATINGS: INDEPENDENT COUNTRIES, 2008, http://www.freedomhouse.org/template
.cfm?page=410&year=2008 (Denmark, Costa Rica, Iceland, Lichtenstein, Norway, Sweden, and
the United Kingdom all given highest ranking (1.0: Free)). Admittedly, there is some circularity
to this measurement because freedom of conscience is one of the ranking criteria and separation
of church and state is not. But the rankings for Freedom House's separate tabulation regarding
freedom of the press alone, which would not be directly affected by religious issues, correspond
closely to its general human rights ranking. See FREEDOM HOUSE, GLOBAL FREEDOM PRESS 2008:
A YEAR OF DECLINE, http://www.freedomhouse.org/uploads/fop08/FOTP2008Tables.pdf (Iceland:
1; Denmark, Norway: 3; Switzerland: 8; Lichtenstein: 12; United Kingdom: 25; Costa Rica: 29 (cf.
United States: 21)). This ranking is confirmed by Reporters Without Borders, Worldwide Press
Freedom Index 2006, http://www.rsf.org/ rubrique.php3?idrubrique=639 (Iceland: 1; Norway: 6;
Switzerland: 8; Denmark: 19; United Kingdom: 27; Costa Rica: 29) (Lichtenstein not ranked) (cf.
United States: 53).
114. See generally RONALD.G. ASCH, THE THIRTY YEARS' WAR: THE HOLY ROMAN EMPIRE AND
EUROPE, 1618-1648 (1997); G.R. ELTON, REFORMATION EUROPE 1517-1559 (2d ed. 1999); MACK
HOLT, THE FRENCH WARS OF RELIGION 1562-1629 (2d ed. 2005); DIARMAID MACCULLOCH,
REFORMATION: EUROPE'S HOUSE DIVIDED 1490-1700 (2003); DAVID OGG, EUROPE IN THE
SEVENTEENTH CENTURY (1962); THEODORE K. RABB, THE STRUGGLE FOR STABILITY IN EARLY
MODERN EUROPE (1976); C.V. WEDGEWOOD, THE THIRTY YEARS WAR (1992).
115. PETER GAY, THE ENLIGHTENMENT: AN INTERPRETATION: THE SCIENCE OF FREEDOM
555-68 (1977); GERTRUDE HIMMELFARB, THE ROADS TO MODERNITY: THE BRITISH, FRENCH, AND
AMERICAN ENLIGHTENMENTS 191-226 (2004); GORDON WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN
REPUBLIC, 1776-1787, at 103-07 (1969).
116. GAY, supra note 115, at 396-447; GERTRUDE HIMMELFARB, THE ROADS TO MODERNITY:
THE BRITISH, FRENCH, AND AMERICAN ENLIGHTENMENTS 152-58 (2004); DANIEL ROCHE, FRANCE
IN THE ENLIGHTENMENT 519-607 (Arthur Goldhammer trans., 1998). These views built on
arguments for toleration that were articulated in the latter part of the seventeenth century while
religion still served as a basis for conflict. For two classic statements, see generally JEAN BODIN,
COLLOQUIUM OF THE SEVEN ABOUT SECRETS OF THE SUBLIME (Marion Leathers Daniels Kuntz
trans., 1975), and JOHN LOCKE, A LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION (1689), in 33 GREAT BOOKS
OF THE WESTERN WORLD (William Popple ed., 2d ed. 1990).
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was the essential inspiration for the religion clauses of the First
Amendment.117
While Establishment Clause doctrine does not include any
explicit recognition that different types of governmental action merit
different levels of scrutiny, the forgoing considerations strongly
suggest that coercive action by the government should be particularly
disfavored. Whatever the rule may be regarding subtle, complex issues
such as the release of children from public school to attend religious
institutions, the use of public facilities by groups that include those
with varying levels of religious affiliation, financial support for
students being educated by religious institutions, or the display of
religious symbols on public property,118 it seems clear that the state
should not compel people to follow the dictates of any given religion or
impose burdens on them for failing to do so.
B. The Religious Character of Laws against Assisted Suicide
Religiously motivated laws against suicide itself were once
common in the Western world, but those laws have generally been
repealed as irrational, unfair, or simply ineffective. 119 Laws against
assisted suicide remain in force throughout the United States,
however. At present, some thirty-seven states have statutes declaring
117. See BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 251-72
(1992); ISAAC KRAMNICK & R. LAURENCE MOORE, THE GODLESS CONSTITUTION: A MORAL
DEFENSE OF THE SECULAR STATE 67-78 (rev. ed. 2005); JACK RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS:
POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 312-16 (1996); GORDON WOOD, THE
RADICALISM OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 189-212 (1991). As Gertrude Himmelfarb points out,
the Americans who associated themselves with the Enlightenment never displayed the hostility
to religion that characterized the French Enlightenment, and the Second Great Awakening,
which occurred at the end of the eighteenth and the beginning of the nineteenth centuries,
brought a new wave of religious fervor to the United States at the same time that it was
becoming organized as a nation. HIMMELFARB, supra note 73, at 204-17. But the Framers' sense
of religion was such that it led to a demand for tolerance and a distaste for coercion, and the
Second Awakening, although certainly intense, was so pluralistic that it served to discourage any
efforts to impose uniformity, rather than the reverse.
118. See, e.g., Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 770 (1995)
(display of religious symbol in public forum does not violate Establishment Clause); Bd. of Educ.
of Kiryas Joel Village Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 690 (1994) (preference for one
particular religion in creating school district violated the Establishment Clause); Lynch v.
Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 687 (1984) (display of religious scene in public space did not violate
Establishment Clause); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 267 (1981) (Establishment Clause does
not bar equal access to public university facilities by religious organizations); Lemon v.
Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 607 (1971) (salary supplement for teachers of secular subjects in
religious schools violates Establishment Clause); Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 315 (1952)
(release of public school students to receive religious instruction is constitutional).
119. See Mojica & Murrell, supra note 80, at 487.
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that it is a crime to assist someone in committing suicide,120 and two
others impose civil penalties on the practice.121 The law is unclear in
nine states,122 and as discussed above, Oregon and Washington now
authorize and regulate assisted suicide.123
Laws that criminalize assisted suicide are suspect under the
Establishment Clause because they use the coercive force of
government to advance a religiously based position. Specifically, as
discussed above, they represent a choice of the traditional morality of
higher purposes over the modern morality of self-fulfillment. The
traditional morality thus favored is specifically Christian.124 It
embodies the Christian view that suicide is a moral wrong and that
those who provide assistance in its commission should be punished.
According to the modern morality of self-fulfillment, however, suicide
is an unfortunate event that should be prevented by therapy, if
possible, but accepted by society as a valid personal decision. To
choose between these two approaches is to favor a particular religious
position over a secular, culturally available alternative.125
120. ALASKA STAT. § 11.41.120 (2009); ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-1103 (2009); ARK. CODE ANN. §
5-10-104 (2009); CAL. PENAL CODE § 401 (2009); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-104 (2009); CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 53A-56 (2009); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 645 (2009); FLA. STAT. § 782.08 (2009); GA.
CODE ANN. § 16-5-5 (2009); HAW. REV. STAT. § 707-702 (2009); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 5/12-
31 [(A) (2)] (2009); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-42-1-2.5 (2009); IOWA CODE ANN. § 707A.2 (2010); KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 21-3406 (2009); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 216.302 (2009); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §
14:32.12 (2009); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 204 (2009); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 3-102
(2009); MICH. COMP. LAwS ANN. § 750.329a (2009); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.215 (2009); MISS.
CODE ANN. § 97-3-49 (2009); Mo. REV. STAT. § 565.023 (2009); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-105
(2009); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-307 (2009); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 630:4 (2009); N.J. STAT. ANN. §
2C:11-6 (2009); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-2-4 (2009); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.15 (2009); N.D. CENT.
CODE § 12.1-16-04 (2009); OKLA. STAT. tit. 63, §§ 3141.1 to 3141.8 (2009); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
§ 2505 (2009); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-60-1 to -5 (2009); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-1090 (2009); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS § 22-16-37 (2009); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-216 (2009); TEX. PENAL CODE § 22.08
(2009); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 940.12 (2009).
121. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 3795.01-.03 (2009); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-662.1 (2009).
122. Alabama, Idaho, Massachusetts, Nevada, North Carolina, Utah, Vermont, West
Virginia, and Wyoming. InternationalTaskForce.org, Assisted Suicide Laws, http://www.
internationaltaskforce.org/assisted-suicidelaws.htm (last visited Mar. 2, 2010).
123. In addition, a number of states have enacted statutes that allow individuals to refuse
life-sustaining treatment, thus codifying the rule of the Cruzan case. Thomas A. Eaton &
Edward J. Larson, Experimenting with the "Right to Die" in the Laboratory of the States, 25 GA.
L. REV. 1253, 1300-18 (1991).
124. See Perry, supra note 6, at 556 (arguing that laws against euthanasia are a form of
"biblical biopolitics").
125. Stephen Carter and Cass Sunstein both argue that the courts should not interject
themselves into this highly controversial issue, but rather allow the democratic debate to run its
course. See Sunstein, supra note 10, at 1163; Stephen Carter, Rush to Lethal Judgment, N.Y.
TIMES, July 21, 1996, § 6 (Magazine), at 29. In some sense, the issue they raise lies beyond the
scope of this Article, which is about the content of the Establishment Clause and does not
venture into larger matters regarding the role of judicial review. But it can be observed in
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If the Supreme Court were to strike down laws against assisted
suicide on constitutional grounds, it would in some sense be taking
sides in the cultural conflict between these two moralities, just as the
state legislatures have taken sides in enacting these laws. The obvious
difference, however, lies precisely in the coercive nature of the existing
prohibitions. If the laws were struck down, no one would be prohibited
from following the traditional morality of higher purposes. The
existing laws, however, prohibit people from following certain aspects
of the emerging morality of self-fulfillment.
In fact, a further argument is available. Even compelling
certain aspects of the emerging morality of self-fulfillment would not
violate the Establishment Clause because that morality, from a
contextualized historical perspective, is not linked to a particular
religion. 126 It would simply be regarded as the government's
permissible use of its coercive authority. But there is no need to go
that far for present purposes. Eliminating laws against assisted
suicide would not result in any government coercion at all; it would
leave people free to make their own decisions in this area.
Arguments that various laws, such as prohibitions on abortion,
should be struck down because of their religious origins have been
offered by others, most notably Ronald Dworkinl27 and Lawrence
Tribe. 128 But as both Dworkin and Tribe acknowledge, these
arguments have foundered on the awkward fact that many laws
originate in religious thought. 129 No one would argue that we should
hold that laws against murder violate the Establishment Clause
because the prohibition is found in the Ten Commandments, or that
we should declare the prohibition of slavery unconstitutional because
it was first advanced by the Quakers and carried forward by
evangelical Christians. 130 Tribe's response is to abandon the argument
in its entirety,131 while Dworkin tries to reconstruct it with a complex
passing that the rationale suggested here, as opposed to the traditional, substantive due process
or penumbral right of privacy rationale for striking down laws against physician-assisted suicide,
rests on a clearly stated constitutional provision.
126. Of course, state compulsion of this sort might be open to attack on the basis of some
other constitutional provision, including the Free Exercise Clause.
127. DWORKIN, supra note 2, at 98-110.
128. Tribe, supra note 14, at 21-25.
129. DWORKIN, supra note 2, at 105; TRIBE, supra note 10, at 1349-50.
130. See DAVID BRION DAVIS, INHUMAN BONDAGE: THE RISE AND FALL OF SLAVERY IN THE
NEW WORLD 231-67 (2006); HUGH THOMAS, THE SLAVE TRADE: THE STORY OF THE ATLANTIC
SLAVE TRADE: 1440-1870, at 449-557 (1997).
131. Tribe, supra note 12, at 1350. Tribe adds that laws against abortion may be based on
secular morality, and that invalidating these laws because they are religiously based "appears to
give too little weight to the value of allowing religious groups freely to express their convictions
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explanation that asserts first that a fetus cannot be deemed a
constitutional person, next that antiabortion laws must thus be based
on arguments about the intrinsic value of life, and finally that such
views about life's intrinsic value are religious ones because religion
can be defined as a set of beliefs about life's intrinsic value. 132
Because Dworkin, unlike Tribe, tries to maintain the position
that antiabortion laws are unacceptable due to their religious origin,
his argument merits some consideration here. To begin with, his
argument rests on the highly contestable claim that a fetus cannot be
a constitutional person, 133 which is precisely the point that many
antiabortion advocates contest.134 Even if one grants that premise,
Dworkin's argument collapses back into the very assertion that he
rejects because the mere fact that views about the intrinsic value of
life have religious origins does not preclude a legislature from
adopting such views for secular reasons. Moreover, he invokes a
questionable definition of religion that seems to have been selected for
purposes of the argument. Standard anthropological and sociological
definitions of religion include a shared or communal division of the
world into sacred and profane,135 a belief in higher powers and an
attempt to propitiate them,136 or the symbolic abstraction of magical
efforts to manipulate the natural world.137 Defining religion as beliefs
about the intrinsic value of life is not unreasonable, 3 8 but it is hardly
a consensus position.
The argument advanced in this Article does not rely on a
general claim that laws against assisted suicide have religious origins.
Rather, it rests on an analysis that in this society, at this historical
time, these laws are based on one particular, specifically religious
concept of morality and specifically reject rival concepts of morality.
They thus align with one side in an ongoing debate within society and
in the political process . . . ." Tribe, supra note 12, at 1350 (footnote omitted). But striking down
anti-assisted suicide laws does not limit the ability of religious groups to argue that assisted
suicide is immoral and to urge individuals to abjure the practice. The freedom that the Free
Exercise Clause grants religious groups (which is presumably what Tribe is addressing) is the
freedom to proselytize, not the authority to impose their views on others.
132. DWORKIN, supra note 2, at 106-09.
133. Id. at 87-90.
134. See Christine E. Gudorf, Contraception and Abortion in Roman Catholicism, in DANIEL
MAGUIRE, THE CASE FOR CONTRACEPTION AND ABORTION IN THE WORLD RELIGIONS 55, 69 (2003);
KRISTEN LUKER, ABORTION AND THE POLITICS OF MOTHERHOOD 5-6, 207-08 (1984).
135. EMILE DURKHEIM, THE ELEMENTARY FORMS OF THE RELIGIOUS LIFE 51-63 (Joseph
Ward Swain trans., 1965).
136. JAMES GEORGE FRAZER, THE GOLDEN BOUGH: A STUDY IN MAGIC AND RELIGION 56-69
(1963).
137. WEBER, supra note 45, at 399-412.
138. John Dewey advances this position in A COMMON FAITH (1934).
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employ the coercive force of the state to impose that side's view upon
the other. This is simply not true for laws against murder or slavery.
This argument is not a claim about society in general but about our
particular society-which is, after all, the society to which our
Constitution applies.139 In other societies, or at other times, things
would be different. At one time, for example, the propriety of child
sacrifice was socially contested, a contest that has left its trace in the
Biblical story of Isaacl 40 and Greek mythology's stories of Tantalus
and Agamemnon.141 But we now treat the prohibition as part of an
unchallenged secular morality; unlike the debate over assisted suicide,
it no longer reflects a contest between conflicting moral positions.
The need for a contextualized inquiry is supported by the fact
that there is no particular set of issues that is necessarily linked to
religion, as anthropologists who have struggled with the definition of
religion would concede.142 In some religions, for example, the
particular type of food one eats is a matter of central importance, but
in other religions such as Christianity, it is largely irrelevant. The
Buddhist religion treats control over one's bodily functions as a matter
of religious observance, but for Judeo-Christian religions, it is an
entirely secular concern. 143
139. Barry Friedman and Scott Smith, in an article that criticizes Supreme Court opinions
and constitutional scholarship for failing to take cognizance of constitutional law's historical
development since the founding, praise the Glucksberg decision-both the majority and the
dissent-as an exception. See Barry Friedman & Scott B. Smith, The Sedimentary Constitution,
147 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 75-76 (1998). Their general point is an excellent one, but the argument of
the present Article is that awareness of history must be projected backward as well as forward.
It is true, for example, that we have developed a rich, complex history of free speech cases and
commentary since 1789, and that an understanding of this history is necessary to make sense of
the constitutional clause. It is also true that the concept of free speech possessed a long history
prior to the time the Constitution was drafted, and that this history is in a very real sense
continuous with the subsequent one, despite the dramatic event of codification in 1789. This is
all the more true of suicide, which has been an issue of central concern for the entirety of
Western history, but not mentioned in the Constitution or addressed by the Supreme Court until
1990.
140. Genesis 22:1-18.
141. 2 ROBERT GRAVES, THE GREEK MYTHS 25-26, 51-52, 291 (1955). Tantalus was said to
have served Pelops, his son, to the gods because he was preparing a feast for them and had run
out of food. Agamemnon's sacrifice of his daughter, Iphigenia, is a more explicit reference to the
practice of human sacrifice, since his purpose was to obtain favorable weather for his fleet to sail
to Troy.
142. See supra notes 135-137 and accompanying text; see also WILLIAM JAMES, THE
VARIETIES OF RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE: A STUDY IN HUMAN NATURE 39-57 (1958) (same point,
from a psychologist's perspective).
143. Even the significance of faith and ritual varies greatly from one society to another. The
Romans were prepared to execute people for refusing to enact ritual sacrifices, but were
unconcerned about their internal beliefs - indeed, they were content to allow people to declare
their lack of belief while performing the required rituals. See FOX, supra note 44, at 421-22. In
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It may seem that the prohibition of a nonreligious act like
assisted suicide should not be regarded as religiously motivated
because it does not involve religious ritual. 144 But religion is much
more than ritual; there are no particular rituals connected with a
Catholic education, for example, but we have no trouble recognizing a
Catholic parochial school as a religious institution. Conversely, rituals
only acquire their religious character in light of the same sort of
contextualized history that was presented in Part I. In a public school
setting, for example, children who misbehave are regularly urged,
when being disciplined, to own up to their actions, admit that they
acted wrongly, and make amends in some fashion. No one would
regard this approach as a violation of the Establishment Clause, but
how different is it from the Catholic sacrament of confession? 145 In
order to know that putting confessional booths in a public school
would violate the Establishment Clause, while urging students to
admit that they were wrong to misbehave does not, one needs to know
the historical context in which those two actions occur. 146
the Middle Ages, Renaissance, and Reformation eras, any sign of disbelief was punishable, often
by death, but the failure to carry out religious rituals was regarded as a less serious and
generally excusable offense. See, e.g., FICHTENAU, supra note 57, at 400-01. See generally
EMMANUEL LE ROY LADURIE, MONTAILLOU: THE PROMISED LAND OF ERROR (Barbara Bray trans.,
1978).
144. Suicide in societies whose religion endorses suicide rather than condemning it has often
involved religious ritual. The two most popularly known examples, sati in India and seppuku in
Japan, were real enough, although both their prevalence and their religious significance have
probably been exaggerated. See EDWIN 0. REISCHAUER, THE JAPANESE 57, 153 (1981); 1 ROMILA
THAPER, A HISTORY OF INDIA 41, 152 (1966). But when the British, employing the coercive force
of law, forbid sati in 1827, it was seen as a serious intrusion on Indian tradition. See LAWRENCE
JAMES, RAJ: THE MAKING AND UNMAKING OF BRITISH INDIA 226 (1997); JOHN KEAY, INDIA: A
HISTORY 429 (2000).
145. Particularly in its contemporary incarnation. See generally SCoTT HAHN, LORD, HAVE
MERCY: THE HEALING POWER OF CONFESSION (2003).
146. While the question may arise about how the Court can know that anything is religion
without at least some sort of agreed-upon definition of the term, it has in fact proceeded to decide
cases under the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses without attempting this daunting
task. The closest the Court has come to grappling with the issue has been, interestingly, not in
purely constitutional cases, but in statutory cases interpreting the conscientious objection
exception to the Selective Service Act. See Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 335 (1970)
(finding conscientious objection on religious basis valid); United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163
(1965) (same). From a theoretical perspective, the Court's instinct seems sensible. Religion is
probably a term that can only be defined as a cluster of culturally recognized practices, with
individual practices that become an issue being evaluated with respect to the cluster. See
LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS 31-36 (G.E.M. Anscombe trans., 1958)
(definition of a "game"). Wittgenstein says: "What is common to [all games]? ... (I]f you look at
them you will not see something that is common to all, but similarities, relationships, and a
whole series of them at that . . .[W]e see a complicated network of similarities overlapping and
criss-crossing: sometimes overall similarities, sometimes similarities of detail." Id. at 31-32.
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As discussed above, it is not necessary for a just society to
separate church and state, 147 but any society that wishes to do so in a
serious manner must rely on a contextualized definition of religion.
Such a definition must identify religious positions in the context of the
actual history of that society. Ancient Romans debated the morality of
suicide in secular terms, with opponents arguing that it represented
an act of cowardice or a disservice to the state.148 In our society,
however, it seems clear that opposition to assisted suicide aligns with
the Christian religion. 149 The emergence of a new, non-Christian
morality that adopts a different stance toward suicide and assisted
suicide highlights the religious nature of that opposition. If we allow
the mere fact that many or all laws had religious origins in the misty
past to immunize laws with current religious motivations from
constitutional scrutiny, we will have undermined the basic purpose of
the Establishment Clause.
C. The Lack of Secular Purpose of Laws against Assisted Suicide
Concerns about the religious motivation of laws against
assisted suicide might be allayed by demonstrations that these laws
have a separate secular justification. This section begins by explaining
the doctrinal significance of this possible response. It proceeds by
arguing that the proffered secular justifications are either too ill-
defined or insufficiently compelling to overcome First Amendment
concerns. At most, they support restrictions on the practice, but not an
outright ban.
Although stated as an independent principle in Weisman,
heightened Establishment Clause scrutiny for coercive governmental
action can be regarded as either the core of the accommodation test or
as one element of the Lemon test. While the coercive nature of a
particular government action may be a matter of controversy, as it
was in Weisman, there can be little doubt that a criminal law is
coercive. According to the accommodation test, any governmental
action that imposes particular religious practices is prohibited, while
noncoercive action is presumptively permitted unless it crosses some
currently unspecified line. Thus, the demonstration that a criminal
law, like a law prohibiting assisted suicide, was designed to enforce
147. See supra notes 113-116 and accompanying text.
148. Aristotle, supra note 26, at 386, 1138a; Plato, supra note 43, at 1314, 873c-d.
149. Of course, other religions such as Buddhism, Hinduism, and Islam take positions on
suicide as well, but the only religion that has influenced American culture to a significant extent
is Christianity. Greco-Roman religion, discussed above, and Judaism have been influential
through the medium of Christianity.
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the views of a particular religion would be sufficient to render that law
unconstitutional and the inquiry would be at an end.
The Lemon test is more complex. Under that test,
governmental action must be scrutinized to determine whether it has
a sufficient secular purpose, whether it advances or inhibits religion
as its primary effect, and whether it creates an excessive government
entanglement with religion. These criteria apply to both coercive and
to noncoercive action, but the demonstration of a secular purpose
would need to be clearer, the connection to religion more attenuated,
and the government entanglement less severe where coercive action is
involved. It may seem ironic that the accommodation test, which is
generally regarded as more lenient toward religion, would be quicker
to strike down religiously motivated criminal laws than the more
stringent Lemon test. The reason, however, is that the accommodation
test focuses primarily on coercion and generally leaves noncoercive
government action favoring religion to the political process.150 Lemon
covers a much wider set of governmental actions, including
noncoercive ones, and thus must articulate a more modulated position
if it is to function as a single test.
Since the Lemon test, despite its bruised and battered
condition, remains the prevailing one, it is important to continue the
inquiry in accordance with its terms. In theory, its three criteria are
disjunctive, so that violation of any one renders the action in question
unconstitutional. It would appear, however, that the first criterion is
the crucial one in connection with the argument this Article advances.
With respect to the second Lemon criterion, laws against assisted
suicide do not advance religion as their primary effect. As discussed
above, the prohibition they establish is a consequence of religion, not
religion itself.15 1 Additionally, those laws do not inhibit religion since
the morality they oppose is a secular one. With respect to the third
criterion, the laws support a religious position, but since they do so by
means of a simple proscription, they do not involve any excessive
entanglement with that religion. Thus, the first criterion is the crucial
one and has been the focus of scholarly debate about the validity of
laws against assisted suicide. The question that the remainder of this
150. But it is difficult to imagine that the Supreme Court, even in the absence of further
appointments by President Obama, would countenance noncoercive governmental actions that
are characteristic of nations with established churches, such as placing civilian religious officials
on a government payroll or providing direct support for religious schools. Since the
accommodation doctrine has thus far been articulated primarily in dissent, however, as an
argument against majority opinions striking down noncoercive action, the contours of the
doctrine are unclear.
151. See supra Part I.B.
[Vol. 63:3:763798
ASSISTED SUICIDE, MORALITY, AND LAW
section will address, therefore, is whether laws against assisted
suicide have a sufficient secular purpose to prevent them from
violating the Establishment Clause, even though they use coercive
force to favor a religiously motivated position.
One basic problem with a claim that laws against assisted
suicide serve a secular purpose is that such a purpose is rather
difficult to define, at least in general terms. These laws currently treat
the assistance as some form of homicide, but assisting someone's
suicide, particularly if the authorization is confined to trained medical
personnel, does not create the sort of threat to public order that serves
as the basis of most criminal laws. A possible justification that
sometimes appears in litigation documents and judicial decisions is
that the state has the authority, and perhaps the obligation, to protect
the lives of its citizens. 152 This can be understood as a claim about
either our existing legal doctrine or about the moral stance that the
government should adopt in general. At the level of specific legal
doctrine, however, it reflects a conflation of disparate principles. The
state certainly has the moral obligation to protect its citizens' lives
from threats by criminals or foreign powers, and it has a
constitutional obligation to protect their lives from its own actions, 153
but that is because people generally want to live. Protecting people
from themselves when they no longer want to live is an entirely
different matter, as Peter Singer has pointed out.154
At the more general level, the idea that the state has a moral
obligation to human life itself is too abstract and ambiguous a claim to
152. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 728-30 (1997); Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't
of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990); Hobbins v. Attorney Gen., 518 N.W.2d 487, 492 (Mich. Ct. App.)
(1994); Melvin Urofsky, Leaving the Door Ajar: The Supreme Court and Assisted Suicide, 32 U.
RICH. L. REV. 313, 363 (1998) (quoting oral argument in Quill v. Vacco, 80 F.3d 716 (2d Cir.
1996)).
153. See U.S. CONST. amend. V ("No person shall be ... deprived of life .. . without due
process of law"); U.S. CONST. amend. XJV ("No state shall ... deprive any person of life ...
without due process of law"). This is, of course, what rights theorists call a negative right, that is,
a limit on governmental action rather than an affirmative government obligation. Whether this
is an important distinction is a matter of debate. Compare Isaiah Berlin, Two Concepts of
Liberty, in ISAIAH BERLIN, FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY 118-72 (1969) (difference is crucial, with
positive rights being a dangerous threat to real, negative rights), and Frank B. Cross, The Error
of Positive Rights, 48 UCLA L. REV. 857 (2001) (same), with Susan Bandes, The Negative
Constitution: A Critique, 88 MICH. L. REV. 2271 (1990) (no justifiable distinction), and Seth F.
Kreimer, Allocational Sanctions: The Problem of Negative Rights in a Positive State, 132 U. PA.
L. REV. 1293 (1984) (two types of rights are dependent on each other). But the only reasonable
way to articulate a positive right in this area would be the right to decide for oneself whether to
live or die. It would be hard to construct a governmental prohibition on the individual's ability to
obtain assistance in committing suicide as a right.
154. PETER SINGER, PRACTICAL ETHICS 194-96 (1993).
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be used in the context that its proponents suggest. 155 While it is
certainly sufficient to provide a rational basis for presumptively valid
legislation, it cannot overcome the constitutional right to be free of
religiously based coercion. The state also has an unquestionable
authority to advance the truth, and this rationale is sufficient for the
creation of the National Science Foundation, the creation and support
of public universities, and even the compulsory education
requirement. But that authority cannot be used to overcome people's
constitutional right to speak, even if their speech consists of
demonstrably false statements. If the government could defeat a claim
of right by invoking vague, resounding phrases of this sort, none of our
constitutional protections would survive.
Further, a particular problem with any claim that these laws
possess an essentially secular purpose is that suicide itself is legal. In
most areas of human activity, if it is legal to perform a particular act,
it is legal to employ an agent to perform that act on one's behalf. It is
legal to travel, to buy property, and to eat food; under what
circumstances would we want to prohibit people from hiring a travel
agent, a real estate agent, or a cook? Of course, society may want to
ensure that only competent people are allowed to provide certain
forms of assistance as a consumer protection measure. But this is not
a problem with respect to assisted suicide. It is generally recognized as
a medical procedure, and our society has a well-accepted system in
place for regulating medical providers.
Efforts to articulate secular justifications for laws against
assisted suicide do not typically rely on generalities about the
meaning of life or the functions of the state, but rather focus on
pragmatic considerations. Yale Kamisar advances a number of them
in a well-known article.15 6 Disclaiming any religious motivation,15 7 he
points to three major difficulties that arise in the most readily
acceptable context for assisted suicide, namely a seriously ill person
requesting assistance in committing suicide from a trained physician.
First, the physician may make mistakes about a sick person's
155. This is the argument that Ronald Dworkin addresses in DWORKIN, supra note 2.
Dworkin's response is derived from his argument against antiabortion laws, see id., namely, that
claims about the intrinsic value of life fall within a transcultural definition of religion.
156. Yale Kamisar, Some Non-Religious Views Against Proposed "Mercy Killing" Legislation,
42 MINN. L. REV. 969 (1958) [hereinafter Kamisar, Mercy Killing]. As its title suggests, the
article is about euthanasia, not assisted suicide. But Kamisar has written a follow-up article
about assisted suicide, Yale Kamisar, The Reasons So Many People Support Physician-Assisted
Suicide, and Why These Reasons are Not Convincing, 12 ISSUES L. & MED. 113 (1996), which
explicitly adopts the reasoning of the original (and hence more famous) article.
157. Kamisar, Mercy Killing, supra note 156, at 974.
[Vol. 63:3:763800
2010] ASSISTED SUICIDE, MORALITY, AND LAW 801
prognosis; second, it may be impossible for a person to truly agree to
her own death; third, apparent agreement can be obtained by outside
pressure, specifically from family members who wish to end the
emotional stress or financial drain of the person's terminal illness.158
While we can take Kamisar at his word that he himself is not
religiously motivated, 15 9 the secular arguments he advances convey a
sense of post hoc rationalization that suggests an underlying
discomfort with suicide itself, a discomfort whose religious origin is
readily identified in our society. All his arguments go to the question
of consent; he focuses on whether the person who is requesting
assistance in terminating her life really wants to die.160 This is
undoubtedly a serious concern. A physician who terminates a person's
life without that person's consent is committing murder. But it is not a
problem that is intrinsic to assisted suicide or otherwise unknown to
our legal system. Sexual intercourse without consent is rape; the
acquisition of another's property without consent is theft. In general,
our entire legal system is centered on the idea that individual action is
permitted unless it is specifically prohibited, and that such action is
something that people have consciously chosen to do or consented to
have done to them. 161
As a result, we have an extensive set of resources for
determining consent. Most proposals for assisted suicide rely heavily
on them. The standard way to ensure that a person genuinely
158. For other statements of these concerns, see WESLEY SMITH, FORCED EXIT: THE SLIPPERY
SLOPE FROM ASSISTED SUICIDE TO LEGALIZED MURDER 122-25 (Spence Publ'g Co., 2003) (1997);
Daniel Avila, Assisted Suicide and the Inalienable Right to Life, 16 ISSUES L. & MED. 111, 130-36
(2000); Daniel Callahan & Margot White, The Legalization of Physician-Assisted Suicide:
Creating a Regulatory Potemkin Village, 20 U. RICH. L. REV. 1, 26-41 (1996); Susan Martyn &
Henry Bourguignon, Physician-Assisted Suicide: The Lethal Flaws in the Ninth and Second
Circuit Decisions, 85 CAL. L. REV. 371, 391-410 (1997).
159. Kamisar, Mercy Killing, supra note 156, at 974; Kamisar, Reasons, supra note 156, at
118-19.
160. There are obviously complex issues regarding consent in euthanasia cases that do not
arise with respect to assisted suicide, specifically the validity of one person acting for another.
161. See Vera Bergelson, The Right to Be Hurt: Testing the Boundaries of Consent, 75 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 165, 171-83 (2007); Malcolm Thornburn, Justifications, Powers and Authority,
117 YALE L.J. 1070, 1113-16 (2008). Professor Thornburn states:
The reason why lack of consent is an important element of so many offenses is that
the wrongness of the conduct in question lies precisely in the fact that it constitutes a
usurpation of another person's exclusive power to decide what shall be done with her
body or property. . . . [I]t is now widely understood that all of these offenses are
usurpations of another's exclusive power to decide what shall happen to his body and
property-and that the equivalent conduct, when undertaken with valid consent, is
not wrongful (and needs no justification) because it is simply carrying out the other's
wishes. As such, consent affirms the other party's power to determine the use to which
his body and property may be put, rather than undermining it.
Thornburn, supra, at 1115.
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consents to some treatment that would be undesirable in the absence
of consent is to obtain explicit, objectively verifiable confirmation of
the person's decision.162 For example, a statute regulating assisted
suicide might require that the person considering suicide be mentally
competent, provide a written or recorded statement, and be orally
examined by a neutral party. The statement, the examination, or both
could be required at two different times to ensure that the decision
was not the product of a passing mood or temporary disorder. This is
certainly a lot more protection than the law provides in many other
situations. People do not need to provide signed authorizations before
engaging in sexual intercourse, and contracts for the transfer of
property require only a single signature. In fact, people do not need to
provide any formal indication of intention before taking their own
lives. When state laws against suicide were repealed, legislatures
could have provided that sanctions such as forfeiture would still be
imposed if the person committing suicide failed to provide a signed
declaration of intent prior to the actual commission of the act. But
instead, suicide has been decriminalized in all cases, even when the
person does it in a temporary state of depression. Assisted suicide
offers many more opportunities to ensure that the person genuinely
intends to commit the act because affirmative obligations can be
imposed on the assistant.
Kamisar's argument relies heavily on cases where consent is
problematic, such as the elderly, sick person who is being pressured by
family members. We can, if we choose, add that the elderly person
controls a large fortune, that the family members are impecunious
sociopaths, that the treating physician has been secretly promised a
large fee by these family members if they inherit, that the elderly
person has a pathological aversion to disagreements with family
members, and perhaps other details that would occur to people who
regularly watch soap operas on television. But all this really means is
162. Professor Bergelson, supra note 161, at 210-15, argues that murder is distinguishable
from rape or theft because the underlying action, killing a person, is inherently wrong, unlike
having sex or transferring property. She argues that this places a greater burden on the consent
requirement, but is nonetheless willing to recognize consent as an excuse because of the value
she attaches to personal autonomy. Meir Dan-Cohen contests the view that consent and
autonomy are complete answers because of the social effects that extend beyond the individual.
Meir Dan-Cohen, Basic Values and the Victim's State of Mind, 88 CAL. L. REV. 759 (2000). In
their place, he proposes human dignity as a master value. The argument here has a separate
basis in religious freedom; it invokes consent only to ensure that the other party is participating
in what is truly a suicide. But it would also pass muster under Professor Dan-Cohen's test,
because assistance in committing suicide, unlike being subjected to slavery or sadomasochistic
treatment (Professor Dan-Cohen's examples) is consistent with our concept of dignity. In fact, the
preservation of one's dignity is often a major motivation for wanting to commit suicide, as the
name of the Oregon statute attests.
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that we should be especially careful about obtaining consent in these
circumstances. 1 63 The mere possibility of abuse is a fairly weak
argument against a public policy and an even weaker one against a
constitutional consideration. The legal system is always required to
draw lines to separate abuses from desired or protected behavior;
relabeling these lines as a slippery slope, which is what Kamisar and
other critics do,164 can only be convincing if one can demonstrate that
the lines are more difficult to draw in the area under discussion,
which is not the case.
It is perhaps indicative of Kamisar's discomfort with suicide
itself that he does not raise what might appear to be the strongest
argument against consent: that a person who truly wants to commit
suicide would simply do so and does not need to obtain a physician's
assistance. The easiest answer to this question is illustrated by two
popular movies, Whose Life Is It Anyway?165 and Million Dollar
Baby,166 involving quadriplegics who find life burdensome in this
condition, although they are neither dying nor in physical pain.
Unable to commit suicide themselves, as an uninjured person could,
they demand that others allow them to make this choice by
administering lethal drugs. As presented in these movies, the
situation is a compelling one. Both characters are unquestionably
competent, their decisions are unambiguous, and they have objectively
understandable reasons for their choices since both depended on
physical movement for their purpose in life.167
But constructing an argument for assisted suicide on the basis
of situations where assistance is required for the individual to take
any physical action is no better than constructing an argument
against assisted suicide on the basis of those situations which may not
be suicides at all. Both rely on empirical variations to sidestep the
central issue. A more convincing answer is that most people who
choose suicide are presumably anxious to avoid the pain and
163. See Martha Minow, Beyond State Intervention in the Family: For Baby Jane Doe, 18 U.
MICH. J.L. REF. 933, 971-74 (1985).
164. Kamisar, Reasons, supra note 156, at 115; see SMITH, supra note 158; Callahan &
White, supra note 158; Marshall Kapp, Old Folks on the Slippery Slope: Elderly Patients and
Physician-Assisted Suicide, 35 DUQ. L. REV. 443 (1996); Margaret Miller, Boot-Strapping Down a
Slippery Slope in the Second and Ninth Circuits: Compassion in Dying is Neither Compassionate
nor Constitutional, 30 CREIGHTON L. REV. 833 (1997).
165. (MGM 1981) (quadriplegic is a sculptor).
166. (Warner Bros. 2004) (quadriplegic is a boxer).
167. In fact, the situation has greater generality than might initially appear, since many
terminally ill people who decide to kill themselves are in hospitals, where convenient means of
doing so are not readily accessible.
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uncertainty of outcome that accompany amateur efforts.168 Even this
may not go far enough, however. The real answer is that the same
arguments apply to assisted suicide as apply to suicide in general.
Whether suicide is a permissible option for an individual is a matter of
deep moral division in our society, and the negative clearly reflects a
religiously based perspective. The state may not coerce individuals to
adopt this perspective unless it has a compelling secular interest in
doing so. The only reason not to allow such assistance is when it might
raise questions about the genuine voluntariness of the person's
decision, which can be addressed in the manner specified above.
The real question is whether it is constitutional to place a
variety of specific limitations on a person's ability to obtain assistance
in committing suicide, or whether such restrictions impermissibly
advance one particular religion and lack a sufficient secular purpose.
Here, Kamisar's arguments are more convincing. Since taking
purposeful action to cause another's death is generally viewed as
murder unless the person consents, it is extremely important to
ensure that such consent has been given. As the Supreme Court held
in Cruzan,69 the state has a compelling interest in making sure that
the person actually wants to die. Moreover, unlike the general
proscription of assisted suicide or suicide in general, rules ensuring
that the person genuinely consents to dying have no clearly religious
origin. Rather, they emerge from the general principle that we use in
our society to distinguish between proper and improper conduct
toward other individuals.
Requiring definitive evidence that a person wants to die in fact
imposes rather strict requirements on assisted suicide. Our society
makes the background assumption that people generally want to live,
and that a person's expressed desire to die is a transient mood that
she will subsequently disavow. Like the general requirement of








You might as well live.
DOROTHY PARKER, ENOUGH ROPE: POEMS 61 (1926).
169. See Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 280-84 (1990) ("[A State may
apply a clear and convincing evidence standard in proceedings where a guardian seeks to
discontinue nutrition and hydration of a person diagnosed to be in a persistent vegetative
state.").
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consent, and unlike the prohibition against suicide, this assumption is
not derived from any particular religious doctrine, and it is equally
prevalent among adherents of both our traditional and emerging
moralities. In constructing rules to implement this requirement,
however, it is also important to avoid going too far and imposing
procedural constraints that rise to the level of religiously inspired
coercion of the individual's personal choices.170
One fairly reliable way to ensure that a person genuinely
consents is to require that her decision be objectively reasonable-the
sort of decision that an average person would make under similar
circumstances. 171 In the case of suicide, those circumstances might be
that the person has a terminal illness and is in serious pain, as the
Oregon and Washington statutes require, or that he is permanently
disabled to an extent that destroys his ability to live a fulfilling life. A
similar formulation has been advanced by C.G. Prado in his analysis
of the circumstances under which the decision to commit suicide can
be regarded as rational from a philosophical perspective.172 His
conclusion, in an essay coauthored with S.J. Taylor, is that suicide, to
be rational, "must be an autonomous choice that is unimpaired, that is
170. Id. at 343-46 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
171. See id. at 277-78. Both Cruzan and the recent controversy regarding Terri Schiavo
turned on the separate question of a living will, that is, whether the two women had given a
sufficiently clear indication before becoming nonfunctional that they would have wanted to die if
they in fact suffered this fate. See U.S. Living Will Registry: Frequently Asked Questions,
http://www.uslivingwillregistry.com/faq.shtm (last visited Mar. 2, 2009). Virtually no one would
be willing to enforce a living will that provided for its execution when the person was still
competent-"kill me if I don't get tenure" - because the person can be asked: "What do you want
now?" But if the person's consent cannot be obtained and there is no living will, complex
evidentiary problems are likely to arise. These may argue against killing nonfunctional persons,
by either administering or withdrawing treatment, but it does not provide an argument against
allowing mentally competent people to obtain assistance in committing suicide.
172. Compare PRADO, supra note 83, at 47-64 (crafting a "rationality criteria" which
considers suicide rational when it is a release from terminal illness; the choice to do so follows
logically from the circumstances, which must be known truly; and it is done after a "cross-
cultural dialogue"), with PRADO & TAYLOR, supra note 74, at 152 (defining rational suicide as
that made autonomously, cogently, and consistent with the individual's best interests), and C.G.
PRADO, THE LAST CHOICE: PRESUMPTIVE SUICIDE IN ADVANCED AGE 145-46 (Praeger Publishers
1998) (1990) (defining rational suicide as any which is "soundly deliberated, cogently motivated,
prescribed by well-grounded values without undue depreciation of survival's value, and in the
agent's best interests" and arguing that this definition encompasses more motives for suicide
than just avoiding severe pain but that even "advanced age is itself a ground for preemptive
suicide"). A similar set of criteria appears in Franklin Miller et al., Regulating Physician-Assisted
Death, 331 NEw ENG. J. MED. 119 (1994); see also SINGER, supra note 154, at 196, 200 (outlining
the guidelines used by the Netherlands courts in determining the appropriateness of voluntary
assisted suicide in any given case and arguing that "voluntary euthanasia" is best justified, in
part, by respecting the rational choices of patients).
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done for cogent reasons, and best serves the agent's interests."173 In
the context of assisted suicide, the "autonomous choice" part of his
formulation relates to the procedure by which consent is determined.
The part about cogent reasons and the agent's interest refers to an
objective standard by which it can be determined that the agent's
choice is a genuine decision, and not the result of a temporary mood or
disordered thinking. This formulation tends to yield a similar,
although somewhat more permissive result than the state statutes,
which limit the justification for assisting suicide to cases where the
person is terminally ill.174
D. The Establishment Clause Rationale vs. the Right to Die
As stated at the outset, current arguments for declaring laws
against assisted suicide unconstitutional generally rely on the idea
that people have a right to die or a more general right of personal
autonomy.1 5 While readily comprehensible in theory, the effort to
embody this idea in constitutional doctrine encounters formidable
difficulties that the Establishment Clause approach outlined above
manages to avoid. This final section discusses the problems that the
right to die or the right of personal autonomy present. It does not
assert any general argument against the constitutionalization of these
173. PRADO & TAYLOR, supra note 74, at 152. In a later work, PRADO, supra note 83, offers a
similar formulation that is intended to avoid making the external standard subject to the
consensus views of a particular culture, and thus less rational in his view. The formulation is
that
[c]hoosing to die is rational when the decision is a valid conclusion following from true
premises that take accounts of facts pertinent to the decision . . . and, additionally,
when . . . the motivation is justifiable to cultural peers and members of other cultures
as not unduly overriding interest in continued life.
PRADO, supra note 83, at 44-45. Prado offers his revised version in response to one of the major
conceptual problems for analytic philosophy, namely its underlying assumption that universal
principles or morality or rationality exist, and can be discerned by argument, in the face of the
empirical evidence for cultural relativism. See supra notes 25-26 and accompanying text. As
previously mentioned, see supra note 83, he imagines that the decision must be validated by a
dialogue among people from different cultures. The solution seems unsatisfactory because it
seems to conflate pluralism with rationality, but is of no particular concern here. This is an
article about the application of the Establishment Clause, and thus is necessarily limited to the
United States. So we can refer back to Prado's earlier formulation, and simply ask whether he
has properly defined the criteria for what we, in this country, regard as a rational decision.
174. Thus, Prado would argue that the decision to commit suicide because one mistakenly
believed that a relatively minor disease was fatal was an irrational decision. A physician, as a
matter of medical ethics, would of course refuse to help someone commit suicide under these
circumstances; instead, she would explain the true nature of the ailment. Enacting this concept
of rationality or medical ethics into law would be constitutionally acceptable under the analysis
suggested here.
175. See supra notes 80-82 (citing sources).
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rights or their philosophic integrity. The point, rather, is that they
present a number of difficulties that the historically grounded
Establishment Clause argument manages to avoid.
The proper way to interpret the Constitution is, of course,
highly contested; three leading approaches, which will be sufficient for
present purposes, are textualism, originalism, and evolutionism.1 7 6
From a textual perspective, 17 the difficulty with a right to die and a
general right of personal autonomy is that they appear nowhere in the
constitutional text, whereas the prohibition against establishing
religion obviously does. To be sure, the reading of the Establishment
Clause suggested here, like most readings of that clause, is
controversial. But all readings of important constitutional provisions
require interpretation of the text, and all are open to debate.
Textualism, despite its fond desires,178 will never succeed in
eliminating interpretation; its only coherent claim is that acceptable
interpretations must be grounded on specific textual provisions such
as the Establishment Clause.
Originalists would presumably conclude that the absence of
discussion about assisted suicide at the time the Constitution was
drafted means that laws prohibiting this practice should not be struck
down on constitutional grounds. 179 But the right-to-die rationale fares
no better than the proposed Establishment Clause rationale from this
176. See PHILLIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION (1984);
ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, INTERPRETING THE CONSTITUTION 129-41 (1987); MARK TUSHNET, RED,
WHITE AND BLUE: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 22-23 (1988).
177. For works adopting this approach, see, for example, ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF
INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW (1997); Gary Lawson, On Reading Recipes ...
And Constitutions, 85 GEO. L.J. 1823, 1833-36 (1997); John Manning, The Eleventh Amendment
and the Reading of Precise Constitutional Texts, 113 YALE L.J. 1663, 1713-20 (2004); Seth
Barrett Tillman, A Textualist Defense of Article I, Section 7, Clause 3: Why Hollingsworth v.
Virginia Was Rightly Decided and Why INS v. Chadha Was Wrongly Reasoned, 83 TEX. L. REV.
1265, 1367-71 (2005); Adrian Vermuele & Ernest Young, Hercules, Herbert, and Amar: The
Trouble with Intratextualism, 113 HARV. L. REV. 730, 774-77 (2000). See generally William
Eskridge, The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REV. 621 (1990).
178. See SCALIA, supra note 177, at 23-29; Lawson, supra note 177, at 1833-36.
179. Regarding the originalist approach, see generally, GREGORY BASSHAM, ORIGINAL
INTENT AND THE CONSTITUTION (1992); RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE
TRANSFORMATION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (1977); ROBERT BORK, THE TEMPTING OF
AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW (1990); MICHAEL PERRY, THE CONSTITUTION IN
THE COURTS: LAW OR POLITICS (1994); KEITH WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION:
TEXTUAL MEANING, ORIGINAL INTENT AND JUDICIAL REVIEW (1999); Lino Graglia, "Interpreting"
the Constitution: Posner on Bork, 44 STAN. L. REV. 1019 (1992); Richard Kay, Adherence to the
Original Intentions in Constitutional Adjudication: Three Objections and Responses, 82 Nw. U. L.
REV. 226 (1988); Michael McConnell, Originalism and the Desegregation Decisions, 81 VA. L.
REV. 947 (1995); Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849 (1989). See
also Daniel Farber, The Originalism Debate: A Guide for the Perplexed, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 1085
(1989).
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perspective. Moreover, if one relaxes the rigors of originalist
interpretation, the Establishment Clause rationale becomes more
plausible. The effect of requiring a demonstration of conscious intent
by the Framers is to shrink the Constitution's reach to issues that
were available and salient at the time. Quasi-originalists are willing
to consider what the Framers would have thought about issues that
have arisen subsequently, and that they could not possibly have
considered, like the rights of prisoners or public school students.180
Assisted suicide belongs in this category. We do not really know what
the Framers would have thought about it. But we do know that they
were products of the Enlightenment, which was aggressively secular.
They had enormous admiration for Roman culture and philosophy,
particularly Plutarch and the Stoic thinkers such as Cicero and
Marcus Aurelius.181 Given the attitude toward suicide: that these
thinkers maintained,182 it seems reasonable to suppose that the
Framers were more sympathetic to the idea, and more hostile to the
commands of Christian doctrine, than either their predecessors, their
immediate successors, or ourselves. To be sure, the same argument
might be used to support a quasi-originalist argument for the right to
die, but that right is much less directly connected to the secular
attitudes of the Enlightenment than the Establishment Clause.
The only interpretive theory that would directly support the
right to die or a right of personal autonomy is an evolutionary one. 183
180. Compare Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity in Translation, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1165 (1993) (how
would the Framers have responded had they been confronted with the issue in its contemporary
context), with H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HARV. L.
REV. 885 (1985) (Framers did not intend for future generations to be guided by their actual
intent).
181. See BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 22-26
(2d ed. 1992) (1967); WOOD, supra note 115, at 51-53; WOOD, supra note 117, at 102-06. Cicero
was particularly revered amongst Enlightenment thinkers. See PETER GAY THE
ENLIGHTENMENT: THE RISE OF MODERN PAGANISM 105-09 (1966). For Cicero's attitude toward
suicide, see supra note 37.
182. See supra Part I.A.
183. For works advancing this position, see, for example, SOTIRIOS BARBER & JAMES
FLEMING, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION: THE BASIC QUESTIONS 79-98, 155-70 (2007);
RICHARD POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW 229-55 (1995); LAURENCE TRIBE, GOD SAVE THIS
HONORABLE COURT 41-49 (1985); Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for Original
Understanding, 60 B.U. L. REV. 204, 230-37 (1980); Rebecca Brown, Tradition and Insight, 103
YALE L.J. 177, 200-O5 (1993); Owen Fiss, The Supreme Court 1978 Term: Foreword: The Forms
of Justice, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1, 41-44 (1979); Michael Klarman, Antifidelity, 70 S. CAL. L. REV.
381, 412-15 (1997); Stephen R. Munzer & James W. Nickel, Does the Constitution Mean What It
Always Meant?, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 1029, 1041-62 (1977); Caleb Nelson, Originalism and
Interpretive Conventions, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 519, 588-98 (2003); Jed Rubenfeld, The Moment and
the Millennium, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1085, 1100-10 (1998); David Strauss, Common Law
Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 877, 928-34 (1996).
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But even if one accepts this approach, the argument for recognizing
either right is not an easy one. In Griswold v. Connecticut,184 the
Court held that the first eight amendments combine to create a
general right of privacy which could then be extrapolated to novel
issues such as a married couple's use of contraception in their home. It
was this same rationale, but grounded on the Fourteenth Amendment
rather than the first eight, that was used to strike down state
antiabortion laws in Roe v. Wade.185 By that point, however, the
characterization of the protection being provided as a right of privacy
no longer possessed the same intuitive appeal. What a married couple
does within the confines of their bedroom seems to fall comfortably
under the rubric of privacy, but a woman's right to a surgical
procedure that is typically performed by a physician at a hospital or
clinic seems like something else entirely.186 Describing assisted suicide
as an element of privacy suffers from this same difficulty, not only as a
pragmatic matter but also as a matter of its basic definition-it
necessarily involves an outside party.187
Many observers have pointed out that the Supreme Court's
right of privacy is better treated as a right of personal autonomy that
is cognizable as an element of substantive due process, rather than a
penumbra of the first eight amendments.188 While this formulation
avoids a counterintuitive use of language, it suffers from serious
conceptual defects. As a legal doctrine, it is overstated because our
society tolerates innumerable restrictions on the autonomy of
individuals that do not advance the autonomy of other individuals.189
184. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
185. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). See generally Rubenfeld, supra note 183 (discussing these cases).
186. For a thoughtful argument that reproductive rights are linked to the concept of privacy,
see ALLEN, supra note 12, at 82-122.
187. For criticisms of the right to die, and efforts to distinguish it from other rights regarding
personal decision making, see Kreimer, supra note 153; Thomas Mayo, Constitutionalizing the
"Right to Die," 49 MD. L. REV. 103 (1990); Marc Spindelman, Are the Similarities Between A
Woman's Right to Choose an Abortion and the Alleged Right to Assisted Suicide Really
Compelling?, 29 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 775 (1996).
188. See, e.g., June Eichbaum, Towards an Autonomy-Based Theory of Constitutional
Privacy: Beyond the Ideology of Familial Privacy, 14 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 361, 365-72 (1979);
Ruth Gavison, Privacy and the Limits of Law, 89 YALE L.J. 421, 459-71 (1980); Louis Henkin,
Privacy and Autonomy, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 1410, 1424-29 (1974); Sanford H. Kadish, Letting
Patients Die: Legal and Moral Reflections, 80 CAL. L. REV. 857, 862-70 (1992); Linda McCain,
Toleration, Autonomy and Governmental Promotion of Good Lives: Beyond "Empty" Toleration to
Toleration as Respect, 59 OHIO ST. L.J. 19, 23-27 (1998); Robin West, Jurisprudence and Gender,
55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 58-59 (1988).
189. Our modern theory of autonomy rests heavily on Kant. See IMMANUEL KANT,
GROUNDING FOR THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 42-54 (James Ellington trans., 2d ed. 1981);
IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 145-71 (Mary Gregor trans., 1996); see also
SCHNEEWIND, supra note 68, at 483-530; ROGER SULLIVAN, IMMANUEL KANT'S MORAL THEORY
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The limitation used to make the principle coherent is that the
autonomy in question refers to the individual's control of basic life
decisions regarding family structure, reproduction, and existence. But
it is far from easy to explain the theme that unites these disparate
issues and divides them from other issues that might seem equally
essential to an individual, such as one's career, the education of one's
children, the kind of medical care that one receives, the place one
lives, or many other activities whose regulation is widely accepted in
our society. It is possible to propose a further limitation of the
autonomy principle to laws involving sexuality. This succeeds in
including most of the cases decided under the right of privacy
rationale, but it does not encompass assisted suicide, which is about as
far from sexuality as a matter of human behavior can be.190
In contrast, the prohibition of laws against assisted suicide
follows naturally from an Establishment Clause rationale. Prohibition
of assisted suicide is readily recognized as one of the core issues on the
conservative social agenda, along with prohibition of abortion, gay
marriage, and perhaps stem cell research.191 Religion, and specifically
a particular view of Christianity, is clearly the motivating force of this
agenda; whatever secular justifications the proponents of this view
may offer, it seems clear as a matter of empirical observation that
they are in fact attempting to impose a religiously based position on
the populace at large. An Establishment Clause rationale for opposing
this effort speaks much more directly to this controversy than more
philosophic theories about the right to die or the right of personal
autonomy.
CONCLUSION
Discussions of suicide and assisted suicide have tended to focus
on the right to die. This Article suggests an alternative to this rather
difficult argument. In the cultural context of Western civilization, the
context into which the U.S. Constitution fits rather securely,
prohibitions against suicide must be understood as religiously
44-50 (1989). But Kant is asserting the moral autonomy of individuals, as opposed to grounding
morality on obedience to tradition or divine command. Legal autonomy does not necessarily
follow from this general principle.
190. The same result follows if one treats the sexuality decisions as embodying the principle
that men and women should be treated equally. Restrictions on abortion necessarily affect
women to a greater extent than men. But restrictions on assisted suicide affect both sexes
equally. See Kreimer, supra note 153, at 1315-25.
191. Although beyond the scope of this Article, a contextualized inquiry into the social
history of these laws is needed to determine if they too raise Establishment Clause issues. For
the argument that they do, see Rubin, supra note 67.
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motivated. They emanate from a particular interpretation of
Christianity, one associated with the morality of higher purposes. This
morality dominated Europe during the Middle Ages, the Renaissance,
and the Reformation eras, but it is now in retreat. It has been
partially, although not entirely, displaced by the modern morality of
self-fulfillment. The morality of self-fulfillment does not prohibit
suicide and in fact would recognize it as desirable, although certainly
not obligatory, under certain circumstances. Laws against suicide or
assisted suicide thus represent coercive action by the government that
imposes the rules of a particular morality, one that derives from
religion, over another morality with more secular derivations.
The Establishment Clause is best read as prohibiting the state
from favoring the doctrines of one religion over competing views,
unless the prohibition has a secular basis independent of religious
doctrine. Laws against suicide or assisted suicide have no such basis.
The concern that allowing assisted suicide will offer an excuse for
murder can serve as a secular basis for regulating assisted suicide, but
not for its outright prohibition. Assisted suicide is distinguished from
murder by the individual's consent, the same principle that
distinguishes sex from rape, exchange from theft, confession from
duress, and a variety of other matters found throughout our legal
system. This Establishment Clause rationale is preferable to any
analysis based on the right to die, because it is based on a much more
explicitly stated constitutional command, and is more specifically
tailored to the issue in question.
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